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Comptrollership has traditionally been associated with
the technical functions of budgeting, payroll, and accounting,
and in addition more recently with the functions of internal
control and automated data processing. As once stated by an
official of a large U.S. corporation: " . . . . double
entry .... as a mode of thinking, is perhaps the trained
accountant's greatest asset." [1] As indicated in the above
quote, the comptroller is often stereotyped as a technician.
It is true that an organization of any size cannot be suc-
cessfully managed in the absence of organized and continuous
information flow concerning where the organization stands
with respect to planned accomplishments, the operating environ-
ment, and actual operational results. It is facilitating this
flow of information which is perhaps the most significant func-
tion of the comptroller. How the comptroller utilizes the
tools available (i.e., human, fiscal and material resources)
in facilitating the flow of information is the subject of
this thesis.
The vast majority of writings on comptrollership deal
exclusively with the technical aspects of the job. It is
the contention of this author that such treatment of the
subject is insufficient to fully prepare an uninitiated

individual to rapidly transition to the position of comptrol-
ler. There is no intention of discounting the requirement
for technical skills; however, an understanding of the or-
ganizational behavior aspects of comptrollership is also
felt to be extremely important. Examples of organizational
perspectives of comptrollership which this author judges formal
comptroller training to be deficient are aspects of the or-
ganizational environment, technological vs. structural rela-
tionships, leadership styles, and decision making techniques.
Mastery of the organizational skills is generally left up to
the neophyte to gain from experience. Needless to say, being
thrown into "the trenches" without the proper organizational
indoctrination can result in poor adjustment to the new work
environment and at the very least a prolongment of the start-up
period sometimes known as "the first hundred days." [2]
With the length of a Navy field comptroller's tour of
duty presently at two to three years, it becomes obvious that
a large percentage of time is spent getting to know the job.
This is especially true when the comptroller is a freshly
trained "first-timer" with no prior experience on which to
draw. That the majority of educational material which deals
with comptrollership is aimed at the technical aspects is
evidenced in the content of the textbook for the Practical
Comptrollership Course at the Naval Postgraduate School. Thirty-
four out of five hundred four pages of text deal with organi-
zational issues and the transition into the job. Further

evidence of the lack of organizational emphasis is found in
the fact that the financial management curriculum at the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) , the primary source of Navy
field comptrollers, requires only one course in organizational
management. Other sources dealing with organizational views
of management available to the comptroller are the Practical
Comptrollership Course (PCC) at NPS (PCC includes one two-
hour lecture on organizational behavior in a ten day program)
,
on the job training, and outside educational pursuits.
B. OBJECTIVE
It is a premise of this thesis that successful performance
of the comptroller ' s technical task requires: 1. an ability
to manage (as a line manager) his/her own organization,
2. the exercise of judgement in the interpretation, selection,
and manner of presentation of information to the Commanding
Officer (CO.). Yet, as indicated above, the author contends
that an appreciation of these factors is not adequately empha-
sized in current training. Therefore, this thesis will present
an organizational perspective on actual comptroller practices
at Naval field activities. The thesis thus represents an
attempt to supplement already available technically-oriented
materials with managerially oriented materials in order to




C. GENERAL APPROACH, METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE
The field of organizational theory is too vast to com-
prehensively cover in a single thesis; therefore, only a select
number of aspects were explored. Although all aspects will
affect the comptroller in some way, only structural, techno-
logical, environmental, leadership and decision making aspects
were examined for this thesis. The principles, theories, and
models discussed were taken from various professional journals
and books dealing with management and comptrollership. Comp-
troller of the Navy directives provided the basis for the
model depicting the formal functions of the Navy field comp-
troller. Data concerning the structural characteristics and
management techniques utilized in actual comptroller organiza-
tions were gathered by means of a questionnaire completed by
field comptrollers at various Naval activities throughout the
continental United States. The purpose of the questionnaire
was to gain insight into actual comptroller operations within
the Navy which may prove useful to the inexperienced comptrol-
ler. The results of the questionnaire were then compared with
the model discussed in Chapter III and conclusions drawn and
presented.
D. THESIS CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter II defines comptrollership and presents a brief
history of comptrollership in the United States Navy. The
formal functions of the Navy comptroller are described and
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and several philosophical viewpoints of general comptroller-
ship from both the public and private sectors are presented.
Chapter III describes comptrollership as a mature formal
organization within the Navy. A model of comptrollership
is presented which depicts how management of the organizational
resources available to the comptroller can affect his/her
ability to function as prescribed by higher authority. The
model is based on the organizational environment and structure,
the comptroller's selection of a leadership style, and decision
making methods and situations. The model is intended to be
used by the new comptroller to facilitate the start-up pro-
cess by facilitating rapid organizational analysis and indi-
cating courses of action. In building the above mentioned
model, various theories from published organizational litera-
ture are presented.
Chapter IV discusses the methods employed in testing the
model including the survey and statistical analysis.
Chapter V covers conclusions which were drawn from analysis
of the data and a discussion of how the model can best benefit




This chapter defines comptrollership and presents a brief
history of comptrollership in the United States Navy. The
formal functions of the Navy comptroller are described and
several philosophical viewpoints of general comptrollership
from both the public and private sectors are presented. The
chapter commences with a discussion of two optional spellings
and pronunciations of the word "comptroller" which are presently
utilized and can cause confusion if not clarified.
A. "COMPTROLLER" OR "CONTROLLER": MORE THAN A MATTER OF
SPELLING
A leading textbook on Management Control states, "In some
organizations, the word is spelled 'comptroller,' but this is
an erroneous spelling, with no basis in etymology, and is, in




' is incorrect.)" [3] Although
"controller" is the correct spelling and pronunciation, a
brief discussion of the two forms of the word is in order
since "comptroller" is most often used when referring to the
public sector.
The word controller gets its derivation from the Latin
contrerole which means one who checks against another or an
official who checks on other officials. The Ancient French
adopted the word and altered its spelling to contre-rolle
13

which is defined in Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary as "copy of an account, or counter register." An
official who checked against the accounts of another could
logically be called a countre-roller . [4] The English picked
up a form of the French spelling of the word as far back as
the 13th century as evidenced by Murray's New English Dic-
tionary's reference to a 1292 English publication in which
the word is spelled contre-roullour. The evolution of the
spelling "controller" followed and held until the appearance
of the spelling "comptroller" in the 16th century. The
change of the spelling is attributed to the scribes of the
day who felt that their jobs were more accurately described
by the French verb "compte," meaning to account or count
,
rather than "contre," meaning against
. [5] The term "comp-
troller" came to the U.S. during the colonization and has
survived to this day in government organizations.
In summary, although the two forms of spelling/pronuncia-
tion evolved from different perspectives on the task of the
comptroller (i.e., to account or to check against another),
today's use is a matter of preference. For reasons unknown
to this author, the public and private sectors cannot agree
on which form is appropriate, so both are utilized. Only




B. HISTORY OF COMPTROLLERSHIP IN THE NAVY
1. Brief Evolution of Federal Treasurer and General
Accounting Office (GAP )
The Office of Controller was established by an Act of
the Continental Congress on September 26, 1778 which replaced
the Treasury Office of Accounts with a Comptroller, Auditor,
Treasurer, and six Commissioners of Accounts. The administra-
tive scheme of the government was altered several times prior
to September 2, 1789 when the Treasury Department was estab-
lished. The Secretary of the Treasury, who served at the
pleasure of the President, became the general manager of govern-
mental finance. Besides the Secretary, the new Treasury
Department also consisted of the Register, Auditor and Comptrol-
ler. In addition to "exercising a review over the Auditor
and serving as a check upon the Secretary, the duties of the
Comptroller specifically were:"
to superintend the adjustment and preservation of the
public accounts, to examine all accounts settled by the
Auditor, and to certify the balances arising thereon to
the Register; to countersign all warrants drawn by the
Secretary of the Treasury, which shall be warranted by
law; to report to the Secretary the official forms of all
papers to be issued in the different offices for collecting
the public review, and the manner and form of keeping and
stating the accounts of the several persons employed there-
in. He shall .... direct prosecutions. . . . for debts that
are, or shall be due the United States. [6]
For many years, confusion existed concerning lines of
responsibility due to continuous changes in the organizational
structure of the Treasury Department until the Dockery Act
became effective in 1894. Evidence of this fact is found in
15

the following quote by J. H. Jackson, "Numerous changes, ad-
ditions, and deletions occurred over the years, with additional
comptrollers, and auditors being appointed, until lines of
responsibility became hopelessly confused. A complete re-
organization of the Treasury and Accounting offices took
place in 1894, when the so-called Dockery Act' became ef-
fective." [7] Among other refinements, the Act gave the
Comptroller the status of an executive officer with centralized
responsibility for the administration of all public accounts.
Further developments introduced to government administration
included accounting methods such as double-entry bookkeeping.
In 1921 the Budget and Accounting Act abolished the
offices of the auditors and comptrollers which had previously
been part of the Treasury Department and replaced them with
the General Accounting Office (GAO) which is headed by a
Comptroller General. The Budget and Accounting Act intended
that the powers of the Comptroller General do not fall under
the direction of any other official. The GAO is an arm of
the legislature with the Comptroller General appointed for
a fifteen year term and not removable except through direct
Congressional action.
2. Department of Defense (POD)
Two world wars in the first half of the twentieth
century resulted in accelerated government expenditures which
caused concern in Congressional circles. This concern was the
motivating force behind the 1947 establishment of the Commission
16

of Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
which became known as the first Hoover Commission. In its
report to Congress in 194 9, the Commission stated: "the
budget and appropriation process is the heart of the manage-
ment and control of the executive branch." [8] In effect,
the Hoover Commission resulted from Congressional concern
about fiscal matters within the executive branch of the
government.
This Congressional concern was carried over into
Title IV of the National Security Act Ammendments of 1949
which is commonly thought of as the commencement of serious
Congressional attention directed at financial management in
DOD. [9] In the same year as the Hoover Commission report,
1949, Title IV was enacted which established the office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and required
a comptroller in each of the three branches of the military.
Title IV was officially called "Promotion of Economy and
Efficiency Through Establishment of Uniform Budgetary and
Fiscal Procedures and Organization." {10]
Prior to the passage of Title IV, however, the Navy
had fully recognized the importance of financial management.
For example, the Office of Budgets and Reports in the Navy
had, since 1941, a function of budget preparation and execu-
tion. As early as 1946, the Navy had recommended to Congress
the adoption of a revised appropriation structure along pro-
gram and performance lines. As a result of prior accomplishments
17

in financial management, the enactment of Title IV concerned
the Department of the Navy (DON) primarily in the following
areas
:
• Bringing together and integrating within one organi-
zation the various fiscal functions being performed
at different organizational locations throughout the
Department;
• Implementing functions where relatively little progress
had been made, such as internal auditing and the estab-
lishment of working capital funds at industrial type
or commercial type activities;
• Improving policies and procedures in all areas of
financial management;
• Placing increased emphasis on the analytical and
interpretive functions of comptrollership as a ser-
vice to management. [11]
The responsibilities of the comptrollers as outlined
in Title IV include budgeting, accounting, statistical re-
ports, and internal auditing. In addition, performance bud-
gets, working capital funds (industrial and stock), and the
Navy management funds were established within the Navy. Since
Title IV has had such a significant impact on the functions of
the comptroller in the Navy, a summary of each section is pro-
vided in Appendix A.
In summary, due to Congressional interest in fiscal
management throughout the executive branch and the DOD, Title
IV of the National Security Act Amendments of 194 9 was enacted
to promote uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures throughout
the DOD. The procedures required by Title IV are intended to
result in greater efficiency and economy in government. Such
are the goals of the Comptroller.
18

3. Department of the Navy (DON)
As a step in implementing Title IV, the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) encouraged participation from his service
secretaries concerning the formulation of criteria for the
different service comptroller organizations. The Secretary
of the Navy (SECNAV) took exception to the initial draft by
the Comptroller of DOD in 1949 concerning the degree of
management control involved in the function of comptroller-
ship. It was the contention of SECNAV that there is no com-
mand or management authority inherent in the job of the
comptroller and that the role of such an officer should be
one of staff only which serves/advises the line management in
the area of financial management.
SECDEF agreed with SECNAV 1 s assessment of the staff
function and clarified the budget and fiscal functions of
the comptroller in a 195 memorandum. The significance of
the above events is that the Secretary of the Navy had gone
on the record defining comptrollership in the Navy as strictly
a staff function which exists to serve line management with
regard to fiscal matters. More will be said concerning the
line/staff issue later in this chapter.
On June 1, 1950, SECNAV established the Office of the
Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) . This act marked the formal
implementation of Title IV within the Navy. Since the initial
implementation, comptroller organizations have been established
at the following types of organizational entities within
19

the Navy: Bureaus and major offices, aaval shipyards,
naval district headquarters, naval supply centers, research
laboratories, major educational and training facilities, naval
stations, naval ordnance plants, ammunition depots, and many
other types of installations. Other developments in the Navy
since 1950 which concern the comptroller include program bud-
gets, working capital and management funds, improved account-
ing practices and better use of the budget process in making
decisions as prescribed by Title IV.
On October 4, 1954, Congress passed legislation which
created positions for two new assistant secretaries to be
added to the staff of SECNAV. One of the new Assistant Secre-
taries was to be designated Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management (ASECNAV-FM) and was to act as Comptrol-
ler of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) . Thus, for the first time, the
Navy was to have a position solely dedicated to the function
of comptrollership at the SECNAV level, a position which had
formerly been held on a collateral basis by the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Air.
4 . Initial Policy
The policy of SECNAV concerning the functions of comp-
trollership in the Navy was first published in 1953 as the
text of SECNAV Instruction 5400.4 which has since been incor-
porated in the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) Manual Volume
I. A summary of the policy aspects are quoted below:
• Navy management under Comptrollership would include
an emphasis on analysis and interpretation (rather
20

than a mere recording and recital of facts) , the utili-
zation of data from all levels to improve the process
of budget formulation and assistance to the Commanding
Officer by providing him with coordinated and integrated
data.
• Comptrollership was added as a basic function for the
operation of an integrated system for financial management.
• The structure of Comptrollership organizations should
be modified to fit local requirements. However, to
maximize the value of staff services, the Comptroller
should report directly to the Commander of the activity.
• The effectiveness of performance by a Comptroller would
be measured by the assistance given to the Commanding
Officer for the timely, efficient and economical exe-
cution of the mission.
• The proper performance of Comptrollership would provide
the Commanding Officer with more time for the areas of
program direction, decision and policy formulation.
• The Comptroller must be responsive to management needs
and anticipate the requirements of the future.
• Comptroller organizations would be established through-
out the Navy including major field activities. [12]
From 1778 to the present, the office of a comptroller
has existed within the government of the United States. Al-
though the title has remained unchanged over the past two
hundred two years, the functions and importance have under-
gone a rather extensive metamorphosis as described in the
preceding paragraphs. The following section will delve into
the current day functions of the field of comptroller within
the U.S. Navy.
C. FUNCTIONS OF FIELD LEVEL COMPTROLLERSHIP
The previously mentioned NAVCOMPT Manual is the basic
guidance which delineates the formal functions of the comptroller
21

in the Navy at all levels. Chapter 2 of Volume I, section
012202, of the manual describes the elements of comptroller-
ship as practiced in the Department of the Navy as follows:
• emphasizing the constructive aspects of the reporting,
analysis, and interpretive functions as distinct from
the purely recording functions;
• improving budget formulation and execution through the
collection and utilization of accounting and program
data at all organizational levels;
• coordinating and integrating the several comptroller
functions to provide concisely to the commanding officer
the basic data essential for efficient, economical, and
effective management.
The basic functions of comptrollership within the Navy
are: 1. maintenance of an integrated system for financial
management; 2. budgeting; 3. accounting and disbursing;
4. program analysis; 5. progress reports and statistics;
6. internal review. These functions as they exist today are
described in the NAVCOMPT manual, Volume I, Chapter 2, article
012100 and are repeated in Appendix B.
In order to adequately understand the organizational as-
pects of comptrollership such as its technology, structure,
and environment, this author feels that a basic knowledge of
the requirements placed on the comptroller is essential. There-
fore, Appendix B sets forth a foundation for the study of comp-
trollership from an organizational point of view by listing
the various functions of the comptroller as promulgated in
the NAVCOMPT Manual. Specific accounting, financial and bud-
getary systems and tools required by the DOD and the DON for
22

the comptroller to accomplish these functions are not the
subject of this thesis. (A review of the specific tools can
be found in Practical Comptrollership Course (PCC) Student
Text used at the Naval Postgraduate School in conjunction with
the two week Practical Comptrollership Course, Financial Manage -
ment in the Navy published by the Naval Education and Train-
ing Command, and the NAVCOMPT Manual
.
D. COMPTROLLERSHIP - VIEWPOINTS AND PHILOSOPHIES
Since the birth of comptrollership in the Navy, literature
on the subject has consistently opened with the declaration
that comptrollership is a staff function with no line authority.
The comptroller reports directly the the commanding officer in
an advisory capacity. A literal interpretation of the func-
tions of the field comptroller listed in Appendix B could
lead one to assume that the staff function involved can be
performed by a technician. The function of advisor to the
CO. could appear to require little managerial expertise. In
effect, the absence of line authority could be felt by some to
preclude the need for managerial skills.
Literature in the private sector, such as Practical Con-
trollership by Anderson, Schmidt, and McCosh, has begun to
contest the "staff only" philosophy attached to the function
of comptrollership as witnessed in the following quote:
The most obvious evolutionary development in recent years
is the growing tendency to reorient the functions of the
controller and that of the treasurer and sometimes the
23

secretary, through the use of the new job title Vice
President-Finance. [13]
One possible explanation for this trend is a recognition
by higher authority that, in addition to the staff function
as an advisor to top management, the comptroller exercises
line authority over the financial organization. Organiza-
tional relationships exist within the comptroller's department
which require managerial expertise in addition to technical
abilities.
Another way of interpreting the staff function of comptrol-
lership is to examine the power inherent in the advisory func-
tion. For example, in addition to collection and reporting
of information, the comptroller analyzes and interprets infor-
mation and its significance for the line manager, all of which
directly contributes to the line manager's actions. By exten-
sion, the analysis and interpretation activities of the comp-
troller involve decision-making, which has a potentially
significant impact on the organization.
Parallels to the above discussion are evident in the Navy,
as expressed in the following passage from the PCC Student
Text:
In addition to directing the internal operations of his
own organization, the comptroller has a responsibility
for interpreting program and fiscal data, and acting as
a technical advisor to command authority on the financial
aspects of operations. Accordingly, he must be responsive
to the needs of management and must anticipate the future
requirements of current programs, with the aim of assisting




It is possible for a comptroller to play it safe by man-
aging the day to day financial operations of the command with-
out seeking new ways to improve efficiency or providing
innovative advice to the Commanding Officer (i.e., new ap-
proaches in departmental budgeting) . However, it is this
author's opinion that, by behaving that way, a comptroller
is apt to be quickly forgotten by a Commanding Officer who
may look elsewhere for meaningful interpretations and guidance
concerning things he may not fully understand.
A former Assistant Secretary of Defense made the follow-
ing observation:
. . . .
as we face a likely future of even more restrictive
budgets, comptrollers will necessarily be spending more of
their time and talents in the stewardship aspects of comp-
trollership - researching new, simpler, less expensive fi-
nancial management tools; finding ways to motivate managers
to save money, rather than spend it; devising data presen-
tation devices that better measure and show actual performance
against plan.
Financial management problems are very seldom just bud-
get problems, or just accounting problems, or just ADP
problems. Financial management is a seamless discipline
and comptrollers who are only budgeteers or only accountants
cannot give their top management full support. The really
effective comptrollers can think and talk intelligently
about all kinds of financial management matters. 115]
Although the private sector has shown signs of broadening
the line responsibilities of the comptroller, this author feels
the comptroller in the Navy remains a staff person, albeit with
line managerial responsibilities within the comptroller's
department
.
In some government agencies, this tendency for the
controller to assume line responsibility became quite
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strong in the 1940s and 1950s. This was usually a conse-
quence of top management's reluctance to accept overall
responsibility. The controller, or more specifically the
"budget officer/ 1 was permitted to make many decisions re-
garding the allocation of resources. With the "power of
the purse," the budget officer became one of the most power-
ful persons in the organization. It has been said that in
some large military installations, the Commanding Officer
was principally in charge of ceremonies, and the real boss
was the budget officer. With the current tendency to se-
lect a good manager as the Number One person, the role of
the budget officer has, fortunately, become more like the
staff role that it should be.
When the controller or budget officer assumed the role
of a line manager, the control system was usually designed
to facilitate the controller's own work. Such a system
slighted the needs of operating managers; that is; it did
not provide them the information necessary to do their
jobs. Consequently, operating managers created their
own informal information systems - called a "desk drawer -
set of books" - because the data were kept there rather
than in formal accounting records. All in all, this was
not a good situation, and the practice is dying out. [16]
In addition to the staff responsibilities the comptroller
has with respect to relationships with the commanding officer
and line responsibilities within the comptroller's own de-
partment, the comptroller has links to other departments
within the command such as Public Works and Supply. Education
and training, including policy guidance, and dissemination of
information concerning departmental financial matters will
head the list. Of primary importance to the comptroller is
the proper preparation, execution, and status of departmental
budgets.
Funding climate (i.e., abundance or scarcity of Congression-
ally appropriated dollars allocated to the activity) and current
financial philosophies of the commanding officer such as
26

budgeting techniques or spending authority need to be com-
municated to the various department heads of a command. This
is necessary if the department head is to be expected to make
financial decisions in accordance with the fiscal policy of
the command
.
The PCC Student Text makes the following points concern-
ing the comptroller's relations with others within the
command
.
The ties which the comptroller must maintain with the
other department heads of the command will require tact,
diplomacy, and goodwill. Making recommendations to the Com-
manding Officer regarding other departments as a result of
Internal Reviews or Management Analyses can cause undue re-
sentment from the department heads concerned. Therefore,
such recommendations should be made with the understanding
and cooperation of the effected department head. In this
regard, personal tact is a primary attribute of a successful
comptroller. Also, communications are sometimes hindered by
department heads unfamiliar with financial matters, who are
reluctant to get involved due to unfamiliarity with termi-
nology. 117] It is possible for the comptroller to break
down this communications barrier by using lay terminology when
dealing with those unfamiliar with financial jargon.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter presented a brief history of comptrollership
in the Department of Defense and in the Navy. The Office of
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the Comptroller was established in the U.S. Government by an
Act of the Continental Congress on September 26, 1778 which
replaced the Treasury Office of Accounts with a Comptroller,
Auditor, Treasurer, and six Commissioners of Accounts. In
1894 the Dockery Act became effective which gave the Comptrol-
ler the status of an executive officer with centralized re-
sponsibility for the administration of all public accounts.
The 1921 Budget and Accounting Act abolished the offices of
the Auditors and Comptrollers which had previously been part
of the Treasury Department and replaced them with the General
Accounting Office (GAO) which is headed by a Comptroller
General.
The first Hoover Commission in 1949 resulted from Con-
gressional concern about fiscal matters within the executive
branch of the government. The report of the Hoover Commis-
sion led to Title IV of the National Security Act Amendments
of 1949 which established the offices of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Comptroller) and required a comptroller in
each of the three branches of the military. Title IV was
intended to promote uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures
throughout the DOD. On June 1, 1950, the Secretary of the
Navy established the Office of the Comptroller of the Navy
(NAVCOMPT) , thus formally implementing the provisions of
Title IV within the Navy. On October 4, 1954, Congress passed
legislation which created positions for two new assistant
secretaries to be added to the staff of SECNAV. One was
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designated Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial
Management and was designated to act as NAVCOMPT. Thus,
for the first time, the Navy was to have a position solely
dedicated to the function of comptrollership at the SECNAV
level.
In order to understand the behavioral aspects of the
comptroller's organization, it is felt by this author that
a basic knowledge of the requirements placed on the comptrol-
ler is essential. Therefore, a comprehensive description
of the functions of the field comptroller within the Navy
is presented in Appendix B.
The remainder of Chapter II dealt with several philoso-
phical viewpoints concerning comptrollership . The debate
over whether or not comptrollership is a line or staff func-
tion was discussed. Additionally, the comptroller's need of
managerial skills and competence in organizational dynamics
was discussed.
The remaining chapters will present and discuss an organiza-
tional model of comptrollership which can be utilized by the
new comptroller to facilitate the start-up process.
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III. ANALYSIS MODEL FOR COMPTROLLERSHIP
The purpose of this chapter is to present several organi-
zational theories which are pertinent to the comptroller's
organization and combine them into a model of comptroller-
ship. The resulting model, which will be referred to as the
"comptrollership model," will be useful to the new comptroller
in initially getting settled into the job by offering a frame
of reference through which to size up the organization and
place emphasis where it is most needed. The chapter sets
the foundation for the model by first defining the formal
organization and then fitting comptrollership into the framework
A. THE ORGANIZATION
In order to discuss the typical comptroller organization,
a definition of organizations in general is in order. Organi-
zations have been described as work-performing and problem-
solving systems consisting of components, structures, and
technologies. [18] Some of the components of the comptroller
organization in the Navy are the people involved and the various
ledgers, forms and equipment such as data processing hardware.
The structure of the comptroller organization is the way the
components or elements are ordered and coupled. The Navy
operates under a standardized formal structure; however, often
informal structures exist for expediency which tend to circum-
vent the formal structure established by higher authority.
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With regard to this model, technology is defined as the ap-
plication of knowledge to perform work. [19] The foregoing
definition can be further expanded to include the application
of knowledge to solve problems, which is the second objective
of the organization as previously defined. Perrow (1966)
defines technology as . . . . the actions that an individual
performs upon an object, with or without the aid of tools or




Organizations generally evolve in a pattern which can
be described using a model developed by Katz and Kahn. [21]
It is felt by this author, as well as by Katz and Kahn, that
an organization's position in the evolutionary cycle may have
an influence in its behavior (e.g., objectives, quality control
emphasis, training philosophy). Therefore, the evolution of
the comptroller organization will be described utilizing the
Katz and Kahn model in order to determine its position in the
evolutionary process and thus what factors motivate the
organization.
The evolution model consists of three stages of de-
velopment for organizations: 1. the primitive stage, 2. the
stable organization stage, 3. the elaboration of structure
stage. The previous discussion of the evolution of
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comptrollership in Chapter II will be referenced with regard
to this analysis of organizational development.
2. The Primitive Stage
The primitive stage is characterized by people with
a common need or an environmental need which results in an
organization producing whatever is required to fulfill that
need. An example is the formation of numerous private secondary
and elementary schools throughout the United States in the late
1960s and early 1970s. The common need was among parents of
white children who opposed bussing or possibly school desegre-
gation in general. The primitive stage of the development
of the comptroller organization within the Navy is marked by
the passage of Title IV of the National Security Act Amend-
ments of 194 9 which, as previously mentioned, was the com-
mencement of serious Congressional attention at financial
management in the DOD.
3. The Stable Organization Stage
Stage two of the Katz and Kahn evolutionary model,
"the stable organization stage," deals with a concept known
as technical rationalization. Technical rationalization is
the result of using cause and effect knowledge to produce a
product or service. A further expansion of the idea of
technical rationalization would be to take measures which
would result in routinization and control of the process.
Inherent in the idea is the notion of control and prediction.
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As the primitive system operates, changes will evolve as a
result of an increased need for performance reliability.
Managerial supervision takes hold and tends to fine tune and
tighten the production system. Following this tightening
process, the model calls for a maintenance structure which
consists of training, selection of people, and a rewards/
punishment system.
An example of the stage two fine tuning system within
the Navy comptroller organization can be found in SECNAV's
interpretation of the comptroller's basic authority: line
vs. staff. The importance of tighter control over the various
comptroller organizations within the Navy was evidenced by the
1954 Congressional legislation which created a full time As-
sistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management who
was designated to act as Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT)
.
Emphasis on training within the comptroller organiza-
tion is evidenced by the fact that future field comptrollers
in the Navy normally attend the Financial Management program
at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) at Monterey, California
NPS also offers a two week Practical Comptrollership Course
which is attended by most budget and accounting officers as
well as by field comptrollers. The lengthy waiting lists for
these courses of instruction are indicative of the emphasis
placed on training.
One final aspect of comptrollership relating to stage
two is the recent emphasis on internal auditing. Although
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internal control is not a new function of comptrollership,
it has recently received renewed emphasis due to the need
for tighter efficiency and economy in operations.
4 . The Elaboration of Structure Stage
The final phase of the evolutionary model is the
"elaboration of structure stage" which deals mainly with
changes caused by environmental forces . The need to remain
current with respect to environmental changes (e.g., energy
crisis, population growth) is a prerequisite for the continued
operation of an organization. Changes in the environment can
trigger shifts in the organization's make-up, procedures, and
possibly even objectives. As a result of this phenomena,
mature organizations in phase three are increasingly interested
in keeping abreast of environmental change and needs with the
aid of research and development programs as well as management
consultants and analysts.
Buffers, both input and output, tend to be created
within mature organizations in order to smooth out the inputs/
outputs of the organization, thereby causing minimal disruption
as the environment changes. Thompson offers the following
propositions and explanation of the buffering process in a
changing environment:
Perfection in technical rationality requires complete
knowledge of cause/effect relations plus control over
all of the relevant variables, or closure. Therefore,
under norms of rationality (Prop. 2.1), organizations
seek to seal off their core technologies from environ-
mental influences. Since complete closure is impossible
(Prop. 2.2), they seek to buffer environmental influences
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by surrounding their technical cores with input and
output components
.
Because buffering does not handle all variations in
an unsteady environment, organizations seek to smooth
input and output transactions (Prop. 2.3), and to an-
ticipate and adapt to environmental changes which can-
not be buffered or smoothed (Prop. 2.4), and finally,
when buffering, leveling, and forecasting do not pro-
tect their technical cores from environmental fluctua-
tions (Prop. 2.5), organizations resort to rationing.
These are maneuvering devices which provide the
organization with some self-control despite interdepen-
dence with the environment. But if we are to gain
understanding, we must consider both in the direction
toward which maneuvering is designed and the nature of
the environment in which maneuvering takes place. [22]
With regard to a naval command's comptroller organiza-
tion, the command, the Navy, or the Department of Defense
can be looked upon as representing a primary environment.
With this in mind, an example of stage three organizational
evolution with regard to the comptroller organization is the
shift back to the idea that comptrollership should be a staff
rather than a line function. As discussed in Chapter II,
these shifts were related directly to the needs and changes
of the "environment" as defined.
An example of an input buffer in the comptroller or-
ganization is the pool of educated and trained people within
the Navy with the expertise to effectively run the organiza-
tions. The Navy is well suited for this form of buffer due
to the requirement to have so many of its people on sea duty.
At any time, personnel shifts can be effected to fill any gaps
in expertise at almost any level. At least theoretically this
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is the case. Personnel shortages presently being experienced
will diminish the effectiveness of the buffer.
Output buffering is evident in stockpiling of materi-
als, cubby-holing unneeded personnel during slack periods,
and contingency funding. Although not formally authorized,
the preceding practices do occur. Various sub-organizations
such as the accounting division, ADP division, or special re-
ports division also tend to serve as output buffers for the
overall comptroller organization.
This section described the comptrollership organiza-
tion with respect to the Katz and Kahn evolution model for
organizations. Comptrollership in the Navy was described as
being in the third phase of organizational evolution, the
"elaboration of structure stage," in which the organization
is quite sensitive to environmental change. The new comptrol-
ler should be aware of this sensitivity and how to contend
with it utilizing such methods as buffering as described.
C. THE MODEL
1. General
As stated in the introduction, the objective of this
thesis is to examine field comptrollership in the Navy from an
organizational point of view with emphasis on the "start-up
process" for the new comptroller. Having described comptroller-
ship from an historical perspective as well as its development
as a formal mature organization, a model representing how
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various organizational variables affect the comptroller's
organization will now be presented. The model, referred to
as the "comptrollership model," is not intended to be all .
encompassing. It will tie several organizational/structural
aspects of Navy comptrollership into a conceptual scheme to
be used by the neophyte comptroller in lessening the trauma
of the initial months on the job. The comptrollership model
was derived from a combination of organizational behavior
theories which will be individually reviewed.
Basically, the model states that optimal structural
characteristics of the organization (such as span of control
or centralization can be determined from a study of the organi-
zation's technological and environmental characteristics; that
optimal leadership styles can be derived from an examination
of individual characteristics of the leader, the followers
and the situation; and that appropriate decision making methods
are associated with different environments of decision making.
The overall operating environment is considered to have
both direct and indirect effects on all other variables in the
model. Figure 3-1 illustrates the comptrollership model.
Prior to applying the model to the comptrollership organiza-
tion, the various components of the model require clarifica-
tion and definition. The effects of the operating environment
will be discussed in conjunction with each of the other three
segments of the comptrollership model. The elements to the
























uncontrollable in the short-term while elements to the right
are considered by the model to be controllable by the comptrol-
ler in the short-term in most situations.
2. Technology/Structural Characteristics
The purpose of this section is to introduce several
conceptual models of organizational structure and technology
to acquaint the reader with the types of forces within organi-
zations which contribute to optimum structural design. Before
proceeding with the discussion of structure, a brief descrip-
tion of the technology of comptrollership will be presented
in order to provide a frame of reference for the analysis of
the technology/structure relationship.
Technology is described by Rousseau (1979) as having
three major phases: input, conversion, and output. {23] As
previously mentioned, the output of comptrollership is in the
form of a service to management. It can take the form of
budgeting information, accounting/control services, reports,
feedback, financial advice, ADP services, or internal auditing
assistance. Output buffers control the flow and quality of the
outputs. Inputs to comptrollership include the basic theories
of accounting and financial management, modern techniques,
people, and equipment. As with output, buffers exist to control
flow and quality on the input side. The conversion process can
be described as some process which adds something to the inputs
for some purpose. [24] In this case, the conversion process is
the practice of accounting, budgeting, reporting, and auditing
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for purposes of providing a service to the command in the
form of financial management and fiscal information/advice.
The "old school" of ideas concerning structural de-
sign of organizations was dominated by such theorists as Fayol,
Gulick, Urwick, and Mooney who were prominent in the early
twentieth century. What these writers had in common was an
emphasis on economy and technical efficiency in organizations
without concern for the human animal. Their primary concern
in the human area was with man's "limited intellectual capa-
city," which was dealt with through division of labor, {25]
The basic idea was that man was motivated by money alone.
The belief that humans are motivated by a single need
and that organizations can be structured around such an idea
has been disputed by theorists such as J. Thompson, T. Burns,
G. M. Stalker, C. Perrow, J. Woodward, J. Lorsch, and P. R.
Lawrence. The findings of the above named behavioral scien-
tists, among others, will be cited in the following paragraphs
in order to clarify how numerous technological and environmental
factors can influence the optimal structure for an organization.
A common thread through each of the theories is the influence
of human inputs and tasks on choices of organizational design.
a. Thompson
James Thompson argues that strategy and structure
are affected by technological variables in an organization. [26]
In developing this theory, Thompson divided technologies into
three types: the long-linked technology, the mediating
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technology, and the intensive technology. [27] According
to Thompson, the way in which coordination and control are
optimally achieved results from the type of technology and
the type of interdependence the technology requires.
The long-linked technology is one which converts
input into output through a series of operations, each related
to the next in a fixed sequence. An example of this type of
technology is the assembly line. The latter steps are depen-
dent on the successful performance of the former, but not
vice versa. Thompson calls this "serial interdependence."
Coordination is achieved through plans.
A mediating technology is one which links together
clients who desire to engage in a common venture but wish to
remain independent of each other. Examples of this type of
technology are telephone utilities, insurance companies, the
postal service, and banks. Although the clients involved with
the mediating organization remain independent, they must act
in a manner which is compatible with each other. At the same
time, the mediating organization must behave in a standardized
fashion. Thompson calls the interdependence among parts of
this type of organization "pooled interdependence" which is
characterized as a situation in which "each part renders a
discrete contribution to the whole and each is supported by
the whole." [28] Coordination is achieved by standardized
procedures and impersonal rules.
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The intensive technology is commonly found in
organizations such as hospitals, research laboratories, and
some engineering firms. The organization contains a variety
of skills and equipment. The manner in which these will be
utilized is unknown until a problem arises. An example of
this is the hospital emergency room. The way in which the
technology available will be utilized is totally dependent
on the needs of the patient. This type of organization is
primarily interested in the ability to meet contingencies
with effectiveness, not necessarily efficiency. Coordination
in this situation of reciprocal interdependence is achieved
through mutual adjustment or feedback. [29]
Thompson, therefore, is saying that the formal
structure of an organization, and in particular, the coordi-
nating mechanisms, are variable and depend upon the nature of
the core technology. {30]
Field comptrollership in the Navy fits most closely
the mediating technology described by Thompson. For example,
if the comptroller is to receive funds with which to operate,
the funds must be provided by an independent source known as
a major claimant. The comptrollership organization must
operate in a standardized fashion and observe rules and regu-
lations with regard to budgeting and accounting functions in
order to provide coordination in this situation of pooled inter-
dependence. The work of Burns and Stalker (1961) further builds
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on this idea with respect to how the organizational structure
is influenced by the environment. [31]
b. Burns and Stalker
Burns and Stalker studied industrial firms in the
United Kingdom to determine what effect the environment, in
particular the rate of change in technologies and markets, has
on how the companies were managed. [32] The results of the
study concluded that methods of management and structure within
firms studied depended on certain "extrinsic factors," and
that:
These extrinsic factors are all, in our view, identifiable
as different rates of technical or market change. By
change we mean the appearance of novelties; i.e., new
scientific discoveries or technical inventions, and re-
quirements for products of a kind not previously available
or demanded. [33]
Burns and Stalker divided management systems into two types
which are effective for organizations in different environmental
situations: organic systems and mechanistic systems of management
The organic system of management is one which is
loosely controlled and in which individual tasks are continually
redefined to fit the organizational objectives. Members of the
organization are totally committed to the task and freely com-
municate both horizontally and vertically. The center of know-
ledge concerning an objective is not necessarily located at the
top of the hierarchy but could be anywhere. Vertical communi-
cations within the organization consist more of consultations
rather than commands. Workers are more concerned about the
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task at hand and the technologies involved than they are with
loyalties to the organization and obedience.
The mechanistic system, on the other hand, utilizes
a formal hierarchy to control various functional tasks of the
organization. Each functional role is precisely defined by
rules and regulations. The location of knowledge is generally
located at the top of the organization and communications be-
tween members of the organization tend to be vertical. Opera-
tions are generally controlled by set procedures, and loyalty/
obedience to superiors is required.
Burns and Stalker concluded that the rate of
change in the firm's environment determines which management
system the successful firm will adopt. [34] For instance,
the firm in the rapidly changing environment (changing tech-
nology and market structure) will tend to move toward the
organic system. On the other hand, the firm in the stable
environment will adopt the mechanistic system of management. [3 5]
It is a proposition of this thesis that the en-
vironment (i.e., the technology and market structure) of the
comptrollership organizations of the Navy is essentially stable
and that therefore a mechanistic system of management is ap-
propriate. This propositon was tested, and the results are
presented in Chapter IV and V. Knowledge of this environment/
structure relationship should aid the new comptroller in under-





Joan Woodward, a prominent British behavioral
scientist began a study in 1953 which resulted in evidence
of systematic relationships between technology and organiza-
tional structure. Her study involved a sample of one hundred
business firms of South Essex, England. The firms were divided
into three major groups according to complexity of technology
as follows:
1. Unit and small batch production, such as custom built
cars
.
2. Large-batch and mass production, such as mass produced
cars.
3. Long-run process production of the same product, such
as chemicals. [36]
As shown in Figure 3-2, successful process-
production firms tended to have longer chains of command and
narrow spans of control. The two extremes, process and unit
batch production firms tended to display informal organizations
and narrow spans of control with no distinction between line
and staff while the middle type or large-batch/mass production
firms displayed basically opposite trends from those at the
extremes
.
In addition, organic systems of management tended
to be dominant in the firms at the extremes, while mechanistic
systems prevailed in the middle ranges. 137] Jobs also tended
to be more specialized in the mass production firms.
Within a few years of the Woodward studies, the
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Summary of Woodward's Research Findings on the
Organizational Structures of Successful Firms
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in Birmingham, England which was unable to duplicate the find-
ings. The Aston group contended that the size of an organiza-
tion, not its technology, was the main determinant of
organizational structure. 138] Later, however, a study by
Peter Blau found that, although the Aston study was correct
in that there was no linear relationship between technology
and structure, a curvilinear relationship did exist; that is,
a "A" relationship in correlations existed only at the
extremes. [39]
Although firms included in the Woodward, Aston
group, and Blau studies were industrial production organiza-
tions, it is felt by this author that the technology/structure
relationships could be extended to service type organizations
such as comptrollership. It is the contention of this author
that comptrollership is analogous to the large-batch/mass
production firms of the Woodward study which are characterized
by fairly standardized products, predictable production steps,
some unpredictability and product variations. [40] This re-
search will test how closely comptrollership organizations
correspond to large-batch/mass production firms as described
by the Woodward model. Close correspondence would further
support that proposition that comptrollership will utilize a
mechanistic management system,
d. Rousseau
Denise Rousseau has compiled various sources of
behavioral theory pertaining to the technology/structure
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relationships which exist in organizations. [41] In a semi-
nar on Technology in Organizations conducted in 1980 at the
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California,
Rousseau presented the theories as a matrix which depicts
certain technological characteristics of organizations on
the horizontal axis and structural characteristics of organiza-
tions on the vertical axis. Figure 3-3 is the Rousseau matrix
which is her summary of the research literature and indicates
first-order correlations (or the lack of correlations) between
the various structural and technological characteristics among
private sector organizations studied. The technological
characteristics listed horizontally are considered to be inde-
pendent variables fixed by the state of the technology under
consideration. The vertically listed structural characteristics
are dependent variables which are unique to particular
organizations
.
The technology variables are descriptive of various
characteristics of the three phases of organizations previously
discussed: input, conversion process, and output. "Standardi-
zation" and "predictability" of the inputs to an organization
pertain to materials, funds, or information which flow into
the organization. "Routineness" of the conversion process is
dealing with the degree to which events are repeated. The
"complexity" of the conversion process deals with the degree
of sophistication of the actual steps necessary to complete the
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to which the conversion process is manual or machine operated
(e.g., computerized). The "use of discretion" is a measure
of how much the lower members of the organization are allowed
to make decisions with regard to the day to day operation
of the conversion process. Output "quality control" refers
to the degree to which the output or product of the organiza-
tion is checked for accuracy or correctness. "Performance
evaluation" is a form of feedback to supervisory management
concerning the performance of supervised personnel output.
The first structural variable examined is "span of
control" which is the number of personnel supervised by a single
supervisor at a particular level in the organization. "Levels
in the hierarchy" is a measure of the number of managerial
levels, illustrative of the length of the chain of command.
"Centralization" is a measure of where decisions are made.
Organizations in which decisions are made (and control held)
at the top are considered to be highly centralized. If decisions
are made further down in the organization, the firm is con-
sidered to be more decentralized. "Formalization" Is indicative
of how much importance the organization places on rules, regu-
lations, and standardized procedures. "Vertical communications"
refer to freedom of information flow up and down the chain of
command. "Interdependence" is the degree to which different
functions within the organization are dependent upon one
another. "Coordination" is a measure of how much coordination
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is required among different functions within the organiza-
tion in order for the conversion process to function smoothly.
"Specialization" refers to the degree of specialization which
is required or exists among the organizational functions.
Although comptroilership within the Navy will dif-
fer in many respects from the private sector organizations
which comprised the studies depicted thus far, the Rousseau
model as applied to comptrollership contends that certain
correlations do exist which can be used to predict structural
set-ups under various conditions. Rather than hypothesize
which relationships might exist for the comptroller, all combi-
nations will be tested in the analysis portion of this thesis
and conclusions will be drawn in the final chapter,
e . Perrow
Work done by Perrow (1967, 1970) in the area of
technology and structure in organizations takes a different
approach than those previously discussed. Perrow categorizes
the technologies of organizations along two dimensions as fol-
lows: "(1) the extent to which logical, analyzable search pro-
cedures can be used in problem solving (along a dimension run-
ning from well-defined to ill-defined problems) , and (2) task
variability (along a dimension ranging from variety in the
task to routineness . " [42]
Perrow contends that the type of technology of the
organization as shown in Figure 3-4 will determine a best
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the organization determined by technology are: "(1) the
amount of discretion that can be exercised by high- and
low-level staff, (2) the amount of power held by each of
these groups, (3) the extent of interdependence between these
two groups, and (4) the extent to which these groups coordi-
nate their work using feedback or the planning of others." 143]
Perrow suggested a decentralized structure for
the craft technologies due to problems which arise in these
industries which require a great deal of low-level decision
making, power and feedback. Furthermore, Perrow felt that the
routine technologies could best be controlled through plans.
This is in line with the previously discussed Thompson
theories. Due to the planning function, top management will
require more power than in the craft industries which will
lead to more centralization. Nonroutine organizations ac-
cording to Perrow, will function best under a flexible, poly-
centralized structure due to the variability and exceptions
which are common to the technology. Perrow called for a
flexible, centralized structure for the engineering organiza-
tions. This was because that although these organizations were
somewhat variable, they still are typified by logical, analytical
search processes which lend themselves well to control by
planning. [44]
The technology of comptrollership in the Navy is
hypothesized by this author to be of the Routine type described




This hypothesis will be tested and the corresponding structure
analyzed in the final two chapters of this thesis,
f. Lawrence and Lorsch
A final conceptual scheme to be discussed focuses
on the relationship between environment and structure. Two
concepts central to this framework developed by Lawrence and
Lorsch are differentiation and integration. Differentiation
is defined as the differences in "cognitive and emotional
orientations among managers in different functional departments,
and the differences in formal structure among these departments."
[45] Integration is "-the quality of the state of collaboration
that exists among departments that are required to achieve
unity of effort by the environment." [46]
According to Lawrence and Lorsch, the amount of
differentiation present among units of an organization would
be dependent on the certainty or uncertainty of the environ-
ment and its diversity or homogeneity. They contend that each
unit or subunit of the organization operated within its own
unique subenvironment which was characterized by some level
of certainty. Whether or not these subenvironments were
grouped together or widely dispersed on the certainty/uncer-
tainty scale determined whether or not the environment was
homogeneous or diverse. [47] Figure 3-5 illustrates a summary of
the relationships the authors found between the certainty of
the units 1 subenvironments and the three unit characteristics
by which the units were measured, i.e., extent of formalized
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Relationship Between the Certainty of the Subenvironment a Unit is
Dealing With and Three of the Unit Characteristics Along Which Dif-
ferentiation Is Measured
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unit structure, interpersonal orientation, and time orienta-
tion. For example, it was found that successful subenviron-
ments which were highly uncertain concerning what needed to
be done tended to exhibit unit structures which were informal,
interpersonal relationships which were task oriented, and a
long time orientation with respect to the tasks of the group.
At the opposite end of the certainty/uncertainty continuum
lie -the successful subenvironments which were more certain
with respect to what needed to be done. They displayed
highly formalized unit structures, task oriented interpersonal
relationships and short time orientations. The interpersonal
orientation relationship with respect to the certainty/uncer-
tainty continuum is curvilinear; hence, both extremes exhibit
task orientations. The middle-ground subenvironments on the
certainty/uncertainty continuum tended to have social inter-
personal orientations.
Lawrence and Lorsch found in their studies that
highly differentiated organizations, those with subenviron-
ments widely dispersed on the certainty/uncertainty continuum,
will require some form of outside integrator. [48] This is
so because of the extreme differences in the orientations of
workers from different subenvironments. For example, in the
plastics industry, it is unlikely that a marketing representa-
tive would be able to communicate effectively with a research
scientist concerning a potential new product. The marketing
representative might be concerned with the needs of the customer
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while the scientist might be more concerned with pushing
the technological state of the art. In order for the goals
of the two individuals to mesh with respect to the overall
goals of the organization, an integrator is required.
It is the contention of this thesis that comptrol-
lership in the Navy falls at the other extreme of the
certainty/uncertainty scale; i.e., homogeneous subenvironments
This is a situation in which all the subunits of the organiza-
tion (accounting, budget, ADP, internal review) are operating
in an environment in which certainty of what is needed is
prevalent and individuals from different subenvironments
share common goal orientations (e.g., meeting budget dead-
lines or efficiency in operations) . As long as the homo-
geneity is maintained, integration should be automatic.
It is important for the new comptroller to be
aware of where the organization's subunits lie with respect
to diversity and homogeneity. In other words, the comptrol-
ler can use the theories of Lawrence and Lorsch as a feedback
device to read the subenvironments and apply whatever integra-
tion is necessary for smooth operation.
Lawrence and Lorsch found two requirements for
successful integration. [49] An organization of low differen-
tiation can usually achieve the required level of integration
through the management structure or hierarchy. This will
provide integration through effective plans and controls.
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Organizations with more highly differentiated units will
require more elaborate systems to achieve integration, how-
ever. Examples are formal integrator positions, integrator
teams, or even departments dedicated to integration.
g. Summary
To summarize, this section has presented a variety
of theories and models relating how organizational structure
can be affected by technology and the environment. The
Thompson, Perrow, and Woodward models dealt with techno-
logical determinism while Burns and Stalker and Lawrence and
Lorsch explored the environmental effects on structure within
organizations. Follow-on chapters of this thesis will relate
the organization of the Navy field comptroller to the theories
discussed in order to increase awareness of the organizational
forces which may confront the new comptroller.
The next section of this chapter deals with de-
terminants of the optimal leadership style for the comptroller.
The comptrollership model states that a proper leadership style
can be selected if certain characteristics of the leader, fol-
lower, and situation are known. This hypothesis will be
explored in relation to published organizational theories.
3. Leadership Style
The second portion of the comptrollership model deals
with the determinants of an optimal leadership style. Although
an important element in all forms of management, leadership
has historically been stressed in the military as one of the
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most vital attributes of the officer. It is not unlikely
that when most people visualize the successful military
leader, General George Patton comes to mind. The stereotype
of the leader has been the hard-nosed, no-nonsense, authori-
tarian figure. Within the past decade, and certainly since
the beginning of the all volunteer military, the armed forces
have followed the lead of the civilian and academic communi-
ties by stressing more group dynamics in leadership training.
With the introduction of human resources management, leader-
ship workshops and "Leadership/Management Training" to the
Navy, "participative management" became the buzz word of the
day. This author feels that perhaps leadership training in
the Navy has stressed one leadership style or another as a
panacea for every situation. It is the contention of this
thesis that there is no single leadership style which will
be optimal for a manager in a given organization in every
situation. This section of Chapter III deals with the different
leadership styles available to the Navy comptroller and the
various factors which influence an optimal choice from the
alternatives
.
Robert Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt have studied
leadership patterns, and their work will be the basis of the
following discussion on leadership styles. [50] The discus-
sion will be broken down into three segments as follows:
(a) leadership patterns available, (b) choosing a leadership
pattern, and (c) long-run vs. immediate objectives.
59

a. Leadership Patterns Available
A continuum of leadership behavior which includes
the range of possible leadership behavior available to a mana-
ger is presented in Figure 3-6. Each type of behavior is
actually a measure of the degree of authority retained by
the manager vs. the amount of freedom allocated to subordi-
nates in the decision making process. The behavior at the
far left end of the scale (Figure 3-6) represents the situa-
tion whereby the manager retains the maximum authority. At
the right end of the scale, the subordinates are allowed the
maximum possible freedom in decision making. Each level of
behavior along the scale will now be examined more closely.
(1) The Manager Makes the Decision and Announces
It . This is the situation where the boss recognizes the problem
and assumes sole responsibility for its resolution. In imple-
menting the solution, action is directed to the subordinates.
In this type of leadership style, the wishes and desires of
subordinates may or may not be considered in formulating the
solution to the problem. Coercion is possible in the implemen-
tation process.
(2) The Manager "Sells" the Decision . This form
of leadership style is similar to the first in that the mana-
ger takes full responsibility for problem identification and
formulation of a solution. The difference in this style, how-
ever, is that the manager does not direct action to the sub-
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that acceptance of the problem solution is in their best
interest. The manager probably anticipates some resistance
to the solution and attempts to soften the blow by explain-
ing what the employees have to gain from its implementation.
(3) The Manager Presents Ideas , Invites Questions
This leadership style is quite similar to the previous one,
however, in presenting ideas to subordinates, the manager
solicits questions. The resulting information exchange is
designed to promote a better understanding among the subordi-
nates concerning the full implications of the decision.
(4) The Manager Presents a Tenative Decision
Subject to Change . This approach actually allows the subor-
dinates affected by the decision to have some limited say
in the decision making process. The manager still assumes
responsibility for problem identification and diagnosis;
however, in approaching the subordinates, the decision is
presented as tenative, subject to change. Dialogue is then
solicited from subordinates concerning the decision prior to
finalization.
(5) The Manager Presents the Problem, Gets Sug-
gestions, And Then Makes the Decision . This is the first
leadership style discussed in which the subordinates actually
enter into the decision making process before some type of
decision is already made or considered. In this form of
leadership, the manager first recognizes the problem and then
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presents it to the subordinates with a solicitation for
alternative solutions. This method is used when it is felt
that the decision will benefit from experience found at lower
levels in the organization. From the resulting list of pos-
sible solutions, the manager selects the one felt to be most
optimal
.
(6) The Manager Defines the Limits and Requests
the Group to Make a Decision . In this method, the manager
still is responsible for problem identification, but the so-
lution process is delegated entirely to subordinates. Certain
limits are set on the subordinates by the manager, however.
(7) The Manager Permits the Group to Make De -
cisions Within Prescribed Limits . This is the extreme
subordinate-centered leadership. Here the entire decision
making/implementation process is delegated to the subordinate
group. Certain boundaries can be set for the group, but the
group still retains freedom of problem identification, solution,
and implementation.
b. Choosing a Leadership Pattern
Having defined the possible leadership patterns
or styles available to the manager, this section will discuss
the factors involved in selecting the optimal alternative.
Tannenbaum and Schmidt state in their model that the important
factors to consider are those found in the leader, the follower,
and the situation. [51] The Navy field comptroller will find
that different situations will lend themselves best to different
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leadership patterns depending on the factors involved. The
comptroller who is sensitive to the various pertinent factors
will best be able to judge which leadership style will be
most appropriate.
The manner in which a manager or leader will
react to a particular problem situation will to some extent
depend upon the manager's own personality and knowledge/
experience level. Tannenbaum and Schmidt list the important
internal forces as the manager's value system, confidence in
subordinates, leadership inclinations, and feelings of security
in an uncertain situation. [52]
The leader's value system pertains to feelings of
how much say subordinates should have in decisions affecting
them. Perhaps there is the feeling that he or she as a mana-
ger is getting paid to make decisions. These feelings will
determine to a great extent where the manager will operate on
the leadership pattern continuum previously discussed.
Confidence in subordinates sometimes may stem from
a general feeling of trust in people. Occasionally, the mana-
ger may feel that no one is competent to make a decision ex-
cept one at the top of the organization such as himself.
Some managers due to personal philosophies of
leadership will probably feel more comfortable in adopting
one particular style regardless of the situation. It could be
highly directive or possibly participative in nature.
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Finally, the manager's willingness to make a
possibly unpredictable situation more unpredictable will to
some extent determine how much decision making will be turned
over to subordinates. [53]
Like the manager, the subordinates bring with them
to the organization certain values, abilities, and expectations
The effective manager will be able to read these forces and
in turn determine what type of behavior on his part will draw
out the optimal subordinate behavior. If the following essen-
tial conditions exist, the manager should permit subordinates
greater freedom:
• If the subordinates have relatively high needs for
independence. (As we all know, people differ greatly
in the amount of direction that they desire.)
• If the subordinates have a readiness to assume respon-
sibility for decision making. (Some see additional
responsibility as a tribute to their ability; others
see it as "passing the buck.")
• If they have a relatively high tolerance for ambiguity.
(Some employees prefer to have clear-cut directions
given to them; others prefer a wider area of freedom.)
• If they are interested in the problem and feel that it
is important.
• If they understand and identify with the goals of the
organization.
• If they have the necessary knowledge and experience to
deal with the problem.
• If they have learned to expect to share in decision making.
(Persons who have come to expect strong leadership and
are then suddenly confronted with the request to share
more fully in decision making are often upset by this new
experience. On the other hand, persons who have enjoyed
a considerable amount of freedom resent the boss who be-
gins to make all the decisions himself.) [54]
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The third set of factors to consider when choosing
a leadership style are the situational forces. These forces
in the situation include the type of organization, the group's
effectiveness, and the problem itself. [55]
In many organizations, there exists a preconceived
notion of how a manager should act. Organizational values and
traditions concerning the behavior of managers is passed down
the line by way of oral communications, job descriptions, and
policy statements by top management. This is certainly true
of the Navy field comptroller. It will be difficult for the
comptroller to practice any form of participative management
without the backing of the Commanding Officer. The size of
the organizational groups and their geographic locations will
also enter heavily into any decision dealing with management/
leadership styles.
Group effectiveness will come into play when making
leadership style decisions. [56] One must ensure that the
group works together with ease and that the group is compe-
tent to handle the problem prior to delegation of the decision
making process.
Related to the above statement, the nature of the
problem will to some extent determine by whom- the decision
will be made. If the manager is best equipped to deal with
all the factors involved, and it would waste time to educate
someone else as to all the details, it may be beneficial
for the manager to make the decision. By the same token, the
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time constraints connected with the problem can determine
where it is to be dealt with. If the solution is required
by the boss immediately, it may be necessary to make the
decision at the manager's level (assuming of course this is
the most expeditious means and the manager has the proper
expertise)
.
The above mentioned factors which affect the
manager's selection of a leadership style will undoubtedly
change from situation to situation. Therefore flexibility
and an ability to read the signs are the keys to success in
choosing the proper pattern.
c. Long-run vs. Immediate Objectives
More than likely, the short term situations with
which the field comptroller will be faced will be determined
by the existing factors which were just mentioned. It must
be pointed out, however, that many of the factors become
variable in the long run and to some extent controllable by
the comptroller. For instance, education and training of
employees can better prepare them to make decisions. In ad-
dition, it may be possible to convince superiors of the virtues
of participative management in some sitations.
The problem arises when deciding upon such long-
range leadership goals just how "participative" you want to
get. First of all, what are the goals which the comptroller
will be trying to achieve through the long-range planning.
The objectives of most modern managers are as follows:
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• To raise the level of employee motivation.
• To increase the readiness of subordinates to accept change.
• To improve the quality of all managerial decisions.
• To develop teamwork and morale.
• To further the individual development of employees. 157]
,rMost research and much of the experience of recent years give
a strong factual basis to the theory that a fairly high degree
of subordinate-centered behavior is associated with the accom-
plishment of the five purposes mentioned. [58] The comptrol-
ler should not force decision making on subordinates who are
not prepared or willing to accept it, however, the subordinates
should be continually confronted "with the challenge of freedom.
"
d. Summary
This section presented a continuum of leadership
patterns which ranged from boss-centered authoritarian to
subordinate centered participative patterns. Following pre-
sentation of the continuum, the forces which exist in the
leader, the follower, and the situation were explored. It is
these forces which must be analyzed when determining an opti-
mal leadership pattern. Finally, it was emphasized that a
successful leader is not one who is authoritarian or partici-
pative in all situations, but one who is able to read the
forces discussed and choose the proper pattern for the situa-
tion. Although short term decisions concerning leadership pat-
terns are determined by existing forces, long term leadership
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goals can be obtained through manipulation of many of the
forces involved.
4. Decision Making Situations/Methods
The third and final phase of the comptrollership
model deals with decision making environments and the result-
ing methods employed to make the decisions.
The decision-making environment or situation can be
characterized along three dimensions; the level of threat
to the organization or the comptroller, the extent of the
time fuze in which to react, and the amount of prior aware-
ness or forewarning that the decision must be made. 159]
Hermann (1972) has designed a cube, Figure 3-7, which depicts
possible decision making situations. The comptrollership
model indicates that different situations will require dif-
ferent decision making methods be employed by the comptrol-
ler. The appropriateness of three decision-making methods
for different decision situations is considered.
The first method is the rational decision-making
method. 160] The rational method assumes that the comptrol-
ler is a rational person who (1) can make a decision from
alternatives, (2) can rank alternatives by preference,
(3) realizes transitivity in preference ranking, (4) will
choose the alternative which ranks highest, and (5) will be
consistent in his or her choices.
The rational decision-making process further assumes
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is not applicable to this process. Objectivity is assumed in
the rational process. Alternative solutions to problems
are listed along with assumptions relevant to each alterna-
tive. After each alternative is fully analyzed, a decision
is made by selecting the alternative which maximizes net
benefit.
On the surface, the rational-decision making method
appears to be the only logical way to go. Upon closer inspec-
tion, however, this is not always the case. It may be a
luxury or even inappropriate at times. For instance, time
constraints may make other decision-making methods more ap-
propriate. Once decisions are made utilizing the rational
method, there is always the possibility of outside disagree-
ment. The decision maker will encounter further difficulties
if he or she cannot conform to what the rational method
indicates is the optimal solution.
In addition to the rational decision process, Allison
(1971) has described two non-rational decision-making methods:
the Organizational Processes method and the Bureaucratic
Politics method. [61]
The organizational processes method differs from the
rational method in the following ways. Instead of looking at
the problem as a whole, it is split up into manageable parts
which are dealt with by different groups in an autonomous
manner. This idea of problem factoring differs from the unitary
decision maker assumption of the rational process. Instead of
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exploring all alternatives prior to making a decision, the
organizational processes method calls for satisficing (i.e.,
considering alternatives only until one appears to be good
enough) . After the first "good enough" alternative is found,
it is chosen as the solution and the process ceases. This
practice of satisficing makes the alternative search process
quite significant. Since the first good alternative is
chosen, the method of searching for alternatives will affect
the order of their appearance to the decision makers and can
therefore affect the outcome of the process. Uncertainty
avoidance is a significant characteristic of the organiza-
tional processes method which is not present with the rational
method of decision-making. In order to promote organizational
stability, procedures with short run feedback are generally
developed, and incremental change takes high priority. A
final attribute of the organizational processes method which
distinguishes it from the rational method is the development
of repertoires or standard operating procedures (SOPs) which
tend to formalize all the preceding characteristics. This is
a method of avoiding past mistakes by repeating actions which
have been successful in the past under various conditions.
These SOPs tend to contain cookbook solutions to problems.
Bureaucratic politics is the second non-rational
method for decision-making described by Allison. Unlike the
two previously discussed methods, the bureaucratic politics
method is based on the power and personal ambitions
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of the decision maker. It is based on the actions which
those persons who possess power take to persuade their
superiors that their alternative or solution is optimal.
Under this method, solutions to problems are sometimes colored
by the ambitions and personal interests of the decision maker.
For instance, rather than arriving at a rational solution to
a problem and letting the analysis sell itself, the decision
maker might attempt to sell a solution which is designed to
benefit his or her career rather than the good of the organi-
zation. Unlike the rational and organizational processes
methods, the bureaucratic politics method for decision-making
appears by this author to be more dependent on the personal
values of the decision maker rather than the situation. The
decision maker which is prone to utilize this method, however,
would probably find it most useful in situations which pose
the greatest threat to his or her career.
Before describing the various decision-making situa-
tions and their ties to the three decision-making methods
discussed, several propositions are presented which indicate
actions which results from three situational attributes: threat,
time fuze, and awareness.
1. Crisis decisions (i.e., high threat, short time, and
surprise) engage more individuals than non-crisis
decisions.
2. In crises, the number of alternative solutions to the
situations that will be identified by the decision
makers will be reduced.
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3. As threat increases, decision time becomes steadily
more important in determining how many alternatives
will be considered.
4. The longer the decision time, the more alternative
courses of action are considered.
5. In - a crisis as opposed to a non-crisis situation,
decision makers tend not to make distinctions between
the involvement of a personal and organizational threat.
6. Under conditions of high threat and limited time,
decision makers become too pressured to discriminate
between alternatives.
7. When threat remains minimal, the amount of available
time makes little difference in the number of alternatives
discussed.
8. When considerable decision time exists, decision makers
tend to enumerate more alternative proposals in situa-
tions that occur as a surprise than in situations that
emerge after a warning.
9. The greater the extent to which an event is anticipated,
the stronger the emotional reaction when the event occurs
(especially when reaction time is minimal)
.
10. The greater the crisis, the greater the propensity to
supplement information about the objective state of
affairs with information drawn from past experience.
(The above propositions have been verified and supported by
Charles F. Hermann (1971) . {62] The following propositions
are assumptions drawn by this author from the three previously
discussed decision-making methods:
11. The rational process, due to its nature of alternative
generation and analysis, will take more time than the
two non-rational methods.
12. The rational process will tend to be utilized more in
situations which lend themselves to alternative genera-
tion and analysis.
13. Non-rational decision-making methods will dominate situ-
ations with short time fuzes for the following reasons.
These situations tend to create stress within the
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the decision-maker which results in (1) repetition of
prior responses regarded as successful, (2) perception
of fewer alternatives available, (3) zero sum (black/
white) thinking. [63]
14. The practices of satisficing and development of SOPs
are useful in situations where decisions must be made
with a short time fuze.
15
.
SOPs and uncertainty avoidance might be used when there
exists a high threat to the decision maker or the
organization.
16. If a decision maker is prone to making decisions based
on personal emotions or ambitions, he/she will most
likely do so in situations of a high threat nature
with a short time fuze. The high threat to the decision
maker will involve a self-protective reaction. The
short time fuze allows the decision to be made without
outside input or approval.
The following discussion will describe how each of the
decision-making situations depicted in Figure 3-7 might occur
in the routine of the Navy field comptroller and, according
to previously enumerated propositions, which decision-making
methods would most likely be utilized.
An example of the crisis situation, characterized by
high threat, short time fuze, and little warning, would be
the comptroller's realization that a department had obligated
funds for some purpose other than for what they were authorized,
This would constitute a violation of Section 3678 Revised
Statutes (R.S.) 31 U.S. Code 628. The most probable course
of action for the comptroller to take in this situation is
to inform the CO., commence reporting procedures in accordance
with SOPs, and investigate/correct the discrepancy as per pre-
scribed procedures. The type of decision-making method most
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likely to be employed therefore, is the organizational pro-
cesses method (propositions 1,2,3,4,6,10,13,14,15). If the
comptroller were prone to making decisions based on personal
ambition, the bureaucratic politics method might be utilized
in the crisis situation (propositions 5,16).
The comptroller might be confronted with an innovative
situation in the form of a top priority project proposed by
the CO. which will have a strong impact on base operations
(e.g., the creation of a new management information system).
The threat is high, time fuze extended, and warning time mini-
mal. This situation would lend itself best to a rational
decision-making process (propositions 3,4,8,11,12). There
is the possiblity, however, that the comptroller might employ
the organizational processes method due to the high threat
factor (proposition 15) . This might be the case if the comp-
troller felt unqualified to act as a unitary decision maker
and preferred to follow previously written guidelines.
A decision-making situation characterized as inertia
would be one of low threat, extended time fuze, and no warn-
ing. An example of this type of situation to the comptroller
would be how to fill a keypunch operator vacancy (one of six)
caused by the resignation of a low-level employee. Due to
the amount of time to develop alternatives and make the de-
cision of how to fill the vacancy, the rational process will
probably be utilized (propositions 8,11,12).
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A circumstantial situation will occur when the comp-
troller is suddenly faced with a requirement to submit a
certain one-time budget execution status report to a higher
command within a few days. There is a low threat factor,
short time fuze, and no warning. Such a situation would
probably be handled by utilizing written procedures or methods
utilized successfully in the past. The organizational pro-
cesses method would therefore be the predominant method
utilized (propositions 9,13,14).
Knowledge that sometime within the next three months
the comptroller will be given twenty-four hours notice prior
to an Inspector General audit is an example of a reflexive
situation. The audit presents a high threat to the command
and the comptroller personnally, must be -prepared for in a
short time period, and had been anticipated. There is little
doubt that previously utilized procedures will be employed
by the comptroller in making decisions relative to preparing
for the auditors 1 arrival. Therefore, the organizational
processes method is most likely to be used in this instance
(propositions 3,4,6,9,13,14,15). Due to the threat to the
comptroller, however, there is a possibility that the bureau-
cratic politics method may be employed (proposition 16).
A deliberative situation would be the same as the
audit described above with the exception of an extended time
fuze (e.g., the dates of the audit are known two months in
advance) . Although an unlikely situation, the comptroller
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would have more time to develop alternatives and make decisions
utilizing a rational process (propositions 3,4,11,12). There
is still a possibility that SOPs will be followed exclusively
to reduce uncertainty due to the high threat factor (propo-
sitions 8,15) .
An example of a routine situation for the comptroller
would be submission of periodic accounting reports. There is
little threat to the organization or to the comptroller, the
time for preparation is extended, and there is plenty of warn-
ing. A situation such as this will probably be performed in
accordance with SOPs since it is frequently repeated. The
organizational processes method of decision making will proba-
bly be used most frequently with routine decision-making
situations (proposition 8)
.
Administrative decisions are those day-to-day situa-
tions in which the comptroller must make quick decisions of
little consequence to the organization. They are anticipated
and usually involve the organizational processes method of
decision making (propositions 9,13,14). An example of this
type of situation would be to decide to make personnel shifts
among functions within the organization.
It appears from the propositions previously stated
that the "threat" and "time fuze" factors play the largest
roles in determining which decision-making methods are most
appropriate for different situations, with "awareness" playing
only a minor role (propositions 8,9). Although a minor factor
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in the model thus far developed, "awareness" must be considered
in analyzing decision-making methods and is essential in
defining the situations.
An ability to recognize the eight decision-making
situations and apply the appropriate decision-making method
has great potential for aiding the new comptroller in the
start-up process. The analysis portion of this thesis will
attempt to show that Navy field comptrollers use mixed
decision-making methods/techniques as decision-making situa-
tions change.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has defined what is meant by a formal organi-
zation and developed a comptrollership model, which repre-
sents how various organizational variables affect the
comptroller's organization.
The comptrollership model, designed to assist the new comp-
troller in the initial months of his tour, states that optimal
organizational structure, comptroller leadership styles,
and optimal decision making methods can be determined from
a study of the organization's technological and environmental
characteristics, individual characteristics of the leader,
followers and the situation, and the predominant environment
for decision making. In developing the model, organizational
theories were taken from the studies of Thompson, Burns and
Stalker, Woodward, Rousseau, Perrow, Lawrence and Lorsch,
Tannenbaum and Schmidt, Allison, and Hermann.
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An illustration of the comptrollership model was presented
as Figure 3-1. As illustrated, the elements to the left of
the vertical dotted line are in the short term uncontrollable
by the comptroller while elements to the right are controllable
in most situations.
The following chapter will present organizational data
from a sample of Navy Field Comptroller organizations. Analy-
sis of data will be discussed as it applies to the comptroller-
ship model.
This chapter presented several propositions to be tested
in the analyses and conclusions of the following two chapters.
The propositions are
:
3-1: Systematic relationships between technological and
structural variables of Navy field comptrollership
can be detected.
3-2: Navy field comptrollership exhibits technological
similarities to Woodward's "large batch/mass pro-
duction" type firms and will therefore exhibit
correspondingly similar structural relationships
(i.e., formalized structure, administratively or-
ganized, clearly defined positions, clear chain of
command)
.
3-3: The technology of comptrollership in the Navy is of
Perrow's Routine type (well structured/low varia-
bility and few exceptions) and displays correspond-
ing structural characteristics (centralized with
power held by comptroller, high interdependence
and high coordination required among functions
within the organization)
.
3-4: Navy field comptroller organizations operate in
basically stable environments and exhibit mechanistic
systems of management.
In addition to the propositions stated above, the comp-
trollership model indicated that Navy field comptrollers use
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mixed decision-making methods/techniques as decision-making
situations change. Analysis of the comptroller data will
attempt to validate that assumption. No analysis was made
of actual leadership styles utilized by Navy comptrollers
due to limitations of the data collection techniques. For
the present, the leadership portion of the comptrollership




IV. THE SURVEY AND DATA ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is ^to look at actual conditions
within Navy field comptroller organizations in order to assess
the propositions derived from the comptrollership model and to
give the future comptroller a glimpse at what types of situa-
tions and problems might be experienced in the field. Data
relevant to certain portions of the comptrollership model
(i.e., technology/structure and decision making situations/
methods) were obtained from the field of Navy comptrollers
via a survey and are presented in this chapter. In addition,
information concerning initial problem areas and advice for
the new comptroller was gathered in the survey. The methodology
utilized in gathering the data as well as analyses of the data
are included. Conclusions concerning the relevance of the




A survey was conducted of a sample of Navy field comp-
trollers via a mailed questionnaire (Appendix C) . In addition
to background data on the command and the comptroller, the
questionnaire was designed to gather data concerning the
technology and structure involved in the particular organization,
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the types of decision making methods employed by the comp-
troller, problem areas encountered by the comptroller, and
advice the comptroller might have for the neophyte.
Table 4-1 summarizes the characteristic or attribute
of the organization or comptroller being measured by each
question of the questionnaire.
2. Measures
Questions 1-8 of the comptroller questionnaire which
measure background information use a nominal scaling measure-
ment technique for the purpose of categorization. No order-
ing among categories is implicit in this type of measurement.
The purpose of the questions was to enable breakdowns of data
by groupings such as military comptroller vs. civilian comp-
troller or first vs. second tour comptrollers. This type of
analysis was not attempted for this thesis but holds promise
for further study. This author does not feel that responses
to such questions will be biased due to their straight-forward
objective nature.
Questionnaire items 9-23 which measure structural and
technological attributes of the comptroller organizations are
based on an interval scaling form of measurement (5 point
Likert scale) . In this type of measurement, objects are not
only ordered with respect to some measured attribute, but the
intervals between adjacent points on the measurement scale
are equal. The basic structure of the questions was derived
in a seminar on Technology in Organizations at the U.S. Naval
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(In utilizing the following information, refer to Appendix C)
CHARACTERISTIC/ATTRIBUTE QUESTION NUMBER
* Comptroller background 1
* Comptroller experience level 2&3
* Size of the Command 4
* Size of comptroller org 5
* Span of control (comptroller) 6
* Levels in hierarchy 7
* Level of command centralization 8 & 9
* Level of centralization within
comptroller organization 10
* Formalization of comptroller organization 11
* Level of vertical communication in
comptroller organization (upward) 12
* Interdependence within the comptroller organization ... 13
* Coordination within the comptroller organization 14
* Specialization within the comptroller organization .... 15
* Standardization of inputs 16
* Predictability of inputs 17
* Routineness of conversion process 18
* Complexity of conversion process 19
* Automation of conversion process 20
* Discretion within conversion process 21
* Output quality control 22
* Performance evaluation 23
The remaining sets of questions deal with the following variables
(in order)
:
* Decision making environment 24
* Decision making methods 25
* Comptroller problem areas (subjective) 26
* Comptrollers' general comments (subjective) 27




Postgraduate School in May 1980. The questions have not been
pre-tested or validated. It is possible that bias could re-
sult in the responses to these questions for the following
reasons: (1) Social desirability could prompt a comptroller
to answer a question in a manner which he/she thinks it should
be answered, e.g., "rules are always followed" or "performance
feedback is always emphasized." This type of bias is possible
with questions 10-12,19,21-23. An attempt was made to mini-
mize social desirability bias throughout the questionnaire
by suggesting anonymity in the responses. (2) Interpretation
of word definitions could cause bias. For example, two comp-
trollers could interpret the word "important" differently in
question #14. All questions are subject to bias of this
nature
.
Question number 24 which deals with decision-making
situations is based on an ordinal scale. This form of measure-
ment ranks objects or situations as to the smallest to the
largest or the lowest to the highest. In this case, the ques-
tion is intended to measure eight types of decision-making
situations from the least experienced to the most experienced
by the comptroller. The situations are based on the eight
extremes of the decision-making cube designed by Hermann. 164
J
The question has not been pre-tested or validated by this
author. Bias could result from interpretation of the situa-
tions. It might also be difficult for some comptrollers
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to accurately assess from memory just how the decision-
making situations experienced are divided up. Nevertheless,
the question should produce general breakdowns.
Question #25 is of the nominal scale type of measure-
ment. The question is designed to measure what decision-
making techniques are utilized most frequently by the
comptroller. The comptrollers were asked to select six or
more choices from the list of techniques provided which per-
tain to the process used for decision-making, although none
chose more than six. The choices were derived from the dis-
cussion in Chapter III dealing with the three types of de-
cision making methods (i.e., rational, organizational processes,
and bureaucratic politics) . Social desirability bias is pos-
sible in this question due to the choices listed. For instance,
it is unlikely that anyone would admit to considering his/her
career above all else in making a decision. The syntax of
the choices could also cause confusion with regard to selec-
tion (e.g., some choices begin with verbs and some adjectives).
Despite several sources of bias in the measures, the
survey is appropriate for the exploratory purpose of this
author which is to document general trends and attributes of
comptrollership in the Navy with respect to the behavioral
aspects of the organizations in light of the model. The data
generated is judged by this author to be adequate for an initial
assessment of the propositions stated in Chapter III.
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Questions 26 and 27 are open-ended and were designed
to solicit responses which deal with actual comptroller ex-
periences for the benefit of the future comptroller. The re-
sponses will be purely subjective and, in addition to serving
as advice to the new or future comptroller, can be used to
evaluate comptrollership in the Navy with respect to the
comptrollership model. The propositions generated in Chapter
III will be supported by responses from these items.
3. Sample Selection
In selecting which comptrollers would receive the
questionnaire, it was decided that in order to reduce the
level of variability among the organizations studied, only
Naval Commands located within the continental United States
would be utilized. It was felt that the unique problems of
an overseas command could have a biasing effect on the re-
sulting data. The results of the survey, therefore, should
be generalizable to Naval Commands in the continental United
States.
Of a population of 499 U.S. Naval Commands in the
continental United States, a sample of 68 was selected utiliz-
ing a random sampling technique. It was felt by this author
that a minimum of 10% of the population should be sufficient
to ensure reliability. Anonymous replies were solicited.
Of 59 total responses (87% of the sample) , 58 were usable for
data analysis. One response was not used due to the inex-
perience of the comptroller (two months) . Of the comptrollers
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surveyed, 74% were military and 26% civilian (question 1)
.
First tour comptrollers comprised 59% of the respondants
with the remaining 41% serving in follow-on comptroller tours
(question 2). The average experience on the job was 28.7
months (question 3). The mean size of the comptroller's com-
mands was 2118 personnel with a standard deviation of 2437
personnel (question 4) . The average comptroller organization
consisted of 51 personnel with a standard deviation of 51
personnel (question 5) . The large standard deviation indicates
a lack of homogeneity of size. This point will be treated
later.
C. DATA ANALYSIS
In the analysis of the raw data obtained from the question-
naire, three aspects of the comptrollership model were
examined. First, the technological/structural data were
analyzed in a similar fashion to that of the Woodward studies.
The Woodward studies attempted to find correlations between
technological and structural variables within industries in
Great Britain. The variables used in the comptroller ques-
tionnaire were those of the Rousseau model. Secondly, the
relationship between decision-making situations and decision-
making methods was examined to determine the predominant
types of decision making situations encountered by comptrol-
lers and what types of decision-making methods are most often
utilized. Finally, content analysis was conducted of the
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comptrollers' general comments concerning problems experienced
and advice to the new comptroller.
1. Technological/Structural Analysis
Means and standard deviations for items measuring
technological and structural characteristics of Navy field
comptrollership are presented in Table 4-2. Correlation
analysis was used to assess the following relationships be-
tween the technological (.independent) and structural (depen-
dent) variables.
Proposition 3-1 ; Systematic relationships between the
technological and structural variables of Navy field
comptrollership can be detected.
Proposition 3-2 ; Navy field comptrollership exhibits
technological similarities to Woodward's "large batch/
mass production" type firms and will therefore exhibit
correspondingly similar structural relationships (i.e.,
formalized structure, administratively organized, clearly
defined positions, clear chain of command)
.
Proposition 3-3 ; The technology of comptrollership in the
Navy is of Perrow's Routine type (well structured/low
variability and few exceptions) and displays corresponding
structural characteristics Ccentralized power held by comp-
troller, high interdependence and high coordination required
among functions within the organization)
.
Bivariate correlation is a form of analysis of two
variables from which a single number results which is de-
scriptive of the relationship between the variables. The
magnitude of the absolute value of the number is indicative
of the amount of change in one variable which is indicated by
change in the other variable. If a group of data points
based on two variables is graphed with each axis representative
of one of the variables, the resulting diagram is known as a
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QUESTION # (VARIABLE MEASURED)
6. (Comptroller span of control)
7. (Levels in hierarchy)
8. (Level of command centralization)
9. (Level of command centralization)
10. (Level of centralization within
comptroller organization)
11. (Formalization of comptroller
organization)
12. (Level of vertical communications
in comptroller organization)
13. (Interdependence within comptroller
organization)
14. (Coordination within comptroller
organization)
15. (Specialization within comptroller
organization)
16. (Standardization of inputs)




















18. (Routineness of conversion process) 2.84
19. (Complexity of conversion process) 1.88
20. (Automation of conversion process) 2.83
21. (Discretion within conversion
process) 2.86
22. (Output quality control) 1.71
23. (Performance evaluation) 1.93
(Refer to Appendix C in interpreting data summary information)










scattergram. The Pearson Coefficient, symbolized by "r,"
is representative of the goodness of fit of a straight line
to the data points of a scattergram. A perfect fit would be
indicated by a value for "r" of +1 or -1. The sign merely
indicates whether the relationship is direct (+) or inverse
(-) . A value of indicates no linear relationship between
the two variables. The value of the Pearson Coefficient "r"
therefore will indicate. the strength and direction of the
relationship between two variables. For purposes of analysis
of the technological/structural relationships involved with
the comptrollership model, bivariate correlations were examined.
Prior to examining correlations between technological
and structural variables, a test for multicollinearity was
run on the independent (technological) variables. Multi-
collinearity is a situation where significant intercorrelation
exists among independent variables. Multicollinearity can con-
found attempts to assess the relative importance and the separate
effects of independent variables. When multicollinearity exists
among the independent variables, there are three possible ways
to rectify the problem. 165] One method is to delete the cor-
related variables from the analysis. A second possibility would
be to combine the intercorrelated variables into one variable
by averaging the data. A third and final method is to use only




The intercorrelation matrix (Table 4-3) presents
Pearson correlation coefficients for each pair of techno-
logical variables. The absolute values of the Pearsons
coefficients presented represent the strengths of the rela-
tionships among pairs of independent variables.
Since the variable "Input Standardization" was sig-
nificantly correlated with three other variables ("Input Pre-
dictability, Routineness of Conversion, and Output Quality
Control") , it was decided to eliminate "Input Standardization"
from the list of technological variables to consider. The
same is true for "Complexity of Conversion," which was sig-
nificantly correlated with "Automation of Conversion" and
"Discretion in Conversion." Since "Input Predictability" and
"Output Quality Control" were significantly correlated with
one other variable ("Routineness of Conversion" and "Output
Evaluation," respectively), it was decided by the author to
combine each pair by averaging responses within each pair.
The two new combined variable inputs were henceforth designated
"Input Predictability/Conversion Routineness" and "Output
Quality Control/Performance Evaluation." In addition to the
new combined variables, two original technological variables
which were not significantly correlated with other independent
variables were "Automation of Conversion" and "Discretion in
Conversion."
The next step in the data analysis process was to test






















Standardization .47* .34* .08 .14 .01 .29* .04
Input
Predictibility .39* -.17 .11 -.18 .20 .13
Routineness of
Conversion -.06 .10 -.06 .19 .11
Complexity of
Conversion .32* .23* -.05 .02
Automation of










variables and the original eight structural variables from
Chapter III. Table 4-4 depicts the correlation matrix for
the test.
The table indicates that the combination of the pre-
dictability of inputs and routineness of the conversion pro-
cess (technological characteristics) are systematically
associated with three dependent structural variables. Specific-
ally, as predictability of inputs and routineness of the con-
version process increases: (1) span of control decreases,
(2) the number of levels in the hierarchy decreases, (3) the
level of centralization within the comptroller's organization
increases.
The results of the analysis further indicate that the
level of automation present in the comptrollership conversion
process is not systematically associated with organizational
structure. Discretion over the conversion process displayed
a significant positive correlation with formalization and the
level of vertical communications within the organization, and
displayed a negative correlation with the number of hierarchical
levels.
The combination of output quality control and per-
formance evaluation level correlated positively with vertical
communications, required coordination among functions, and
specialization of functions. A negative relationship between
output quality control/performance evaluation and hierarchical
levels was found. In summary, the above stated correlations
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Communicat ions -.03 .12 .27* .35*
Interdependence
Among Functions .10 .12 -.13 .08
Coordination
Between Functions










Like Woodward's large batch/mass production firms,
comptroller organizations are between the two extremes with
regard to predictability and routinization. This is indicated
by the midrange mean responses to the questionnaire items
dealing with predictability and routineness (2.47 and 2.84
respectively) . Other structural traits which the questionnaire
results indicate match the large batch/mass production firms
are (1) formal organizations, (2) organized by administrative
process, (3) clearly defined positions, and (4) clear chain of
command. These data provide support for Proposition 3-2.
The questionnaire data further indicate that the typical
comptroller's organization is highly structured, has low varia-
bility of inputs and routine, and has few exceptions. With
the exception of high centralization, the data indicate that
comptrollership fits Perrow's model of structural characteris-
tics for a "Routine" organization (High interdependence and
required coordination between functions) (Proposition 3-3)
.
2. Analysis of Decision-making Situations and Decision-
making Methods
The comptrollership model hypothesizes that the various
decision-making situations which the comptroller may encounter
should have some effect on the type of decision making methods
employed. Navy field comptrollers used mixed decision-making
methods/techniques as decision-making situations change. The
various situations along with possible decision-making methods




APPROPRIATE METHOD DECISION-MAKING SITUATION
1. Rational Innovative, Inertia,
Deliberative




3. Bureaucratic Politics Possibly Crisis, Reflexive
The questionnaire which was sent out to Navy field comptrol-
lers was designed to ascertain what percentage of time each
decision-making situation was experienced by each comptroller
and what type of decision-making methods were being utilized.
Tables 4-5 and 4-6 indicate the results of the pertinent
questions from the survey (questions #24 and #25)
.
Of the techniques for decision-making listed in the
questionnaire, six indicate the rational method, five the
organizational processes method, and three the bureaucratic
politics method. In order to compensate for this, a weighted
average of responses for each method was used in the analysis.
Based on weighted averages, analysis of the data indicates the
following:
• The average number of Rational Process techniques chosen
was 4.12 or 57.4% of the total responses.
• The average number of Organizational Process techniques
chosen was 1.67 or 27.9% of the total responses.
• The average number of Bureaucratic Politics techniques
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The following table depicts the percentage of comptrollers who utilize
each decision-making technique characteristic of a particular process
(listed in order of popularity)
.
PERCENTAGE
DECISION MAKING TECHNIQUE SELECTION
1. Develop alternatives (rational process) 91%
2. Make decision by picking best alternative (rational process) 86%
3. State the objective (rational process) 85%
4. Analyze alternatives (rational process) 79%
5. List assumptions concerning alternatives (rational process) 55%
6. Follow SOP/regulations (organizational process method) 52%
7. Sell decision to CO (bureaucratic politics method) 45%
8. Prefer incremental change (organizational process) 43%
9. Divide problem into factors (organizational process) 19%
10. Pick alternative which provides feedback (org. process) 17%
11. Unitary decision maker (rational process) 12%
12. Personal interests (bureaucratic politics) 9%
13. Pick first acceptable alternative (organizational process) 2%
14. Effect on own career (bureaucratic politics)




chosen was 0.53 or 14.8% of the total responses.
• Utilizing the comptrollership model, we would expect
the rational process to be used in the following decision-
making situations: innovative, inertia, and deliberative.
The questionnaire indicated that these situations occur
on the average 58.8% of the time; therefore, we predict
that the rational process method will be used approximately
59% of the time.
• Utilizing the comptrollership model, we predict that the
organizational processes method of decision-making to be
used in the circumstantial, routine, and administrative
situations. These situations occurred 21.5% of the time
(as ascertained from the data)
.
• Utilizing the comptrollership model, we predict that the
bureaucratic politics method of decision-making will be
used in the crisis and the reflexive situations or 0-19.7%
of the time.
In summary the following relationships were obtained from the
results of the comptrollership questionnaire with regard to
decision making:










of the comptrollers surveyed. The results of the analysis
indicated that combinations of methods are utilized in fairly
near the proportions predicted by the comptrollership model.
3. Analysis of Comptrollers ' General Comments
The responses to the final two questions in the comp-
troller questionnaire comprise Appendices D and E. Appendix
D deals with problems expressed by the comptrollers which oc-
curred within their first hundred days on the job. It is
interesting to note that of 104 problems expressed by the 58
respondents, 26(25%) dealt with funding and technical areas
such as budgeting and accounting techniques while 78 (75%)
dealt with organizational behavior topics such as those in-
cluded in the comptrollership model. A breakdown of the
behavioral topics as they relate to the comptrollership model
is as follows: (1) technology/structure - 50%, (2) leadership •
46%, (3) decision-making - 4%. The same trend exists for the
second question (Appendix E) which solicited advice for the
new comptroller. While only 22 (16%) dealt with technical
matters, 120 (84%) stressed the behavioral side of the comp-
trollership function and organization. The above response
breakdowns were achieved through content analysis of Appendices
D and E.
Some of the most frequently mentioned statements from
Appendix E (advice to the comptroller) are quoted below:




b. Get to know the functions of every other department
within the command, and get to know the other depart-
ment heads personally.
c. Learn the functions of the people in your organization.
d. Establish and maintain your credibility.
e. Be fair and honest.
f
.
Get out and see what is going on around you.
g. Go slow and first and listen a lot.
The data obtained from questions 26 and 27 (Appendices
D and E) , along with information pertaining to the functions
of the comptroller (Appendix B) , aid in substantiating the
following proposition:
Proposition 3-4 ; Navy field comptroller organizations
operate in basically stable environments and exhibit
mechanistic systems of management.
Once the fiscal year commences and budget execution begins
,
the operation of the comptroller organization becomes quite
predictable. The fact that the environment changes very rarely,
with the exception of new people due to rotations, creates an
atmosphere conducive to rules and regulations, formal hierarchies,
and formalized structures. The comments in Appendix E indicate
that knowledge is generally located at the top of the organiza-
tion and communications between members of the organization
tend to be vertical. These are the characteristics of a




This chapter examined actual conditions at Navy field
comptroller organizations and related them to the comptroller-
ship model. The vehicle utilized for data collection was a
written questionnaire which was mailed to 68 comptrollers.
Bias will tend to compromise the validity of the results
of the questionnaire in several respects as explained in this
chapter; however, the findings are adequate for the explora-
tory nature of this thesis . Correlations between the techno-
logical and structural variables of Navy field comptrollership
do exist (prop. 3-1) . These correlations were presented in
Table 4-4. It was further found that Navy field comptroller-
ship exhibited technological similarities to Woodward's "large
batch/mass production" type firms and exhibited corresponding
structural relationships (i.e., formalized structure, administra-
tively organized, clearly defined positions, clear chain of
command) (prop. 3-2) .
The technology of comptrollership in the Navy is of Perrow's
"routine" type (well structured/low variability and few excep-
tions) and displays corresponding structural characteristics
(centralized with power held by comptroller, high interdepen-
dence and high coordination required among functions within the
organization) (prop. 3-3) . In addition, Navy field comptroller
organizations operate in basically stable environments and




Decision-making situations and methods utilized by Navy
comptrollers were analyzed and compared to validate the hy-
pothesis of the comptrollership model. It was found that
comptrollers utilize various decision-making techniques ger-
main to different methods, rather than using a particular
method exclusively.
In general, the data indicate the following characteris-
tics of the typical comptroller in the Navy and his/her
organization: The average Navy field comptroller is military
(74%) and experiencing a first tour in comptrollership. The
sizes of Navy commands are widely dispersed with an average
personnel compliment of 2118 including 51 military and civilian
personnel in the comptroller's department. The typical
comptroller organization has three hierarchical levels in the
chain of command with four to five supervisory employees re-
porting directly to the comptroller.
In the majority of Naval commands surveyed, command finan-
cial decisions are made at the CO. level relying heavily on
advice from the comptroller. Within the comptroller organiza-
tions themselves, routine decisions tend to be made at secondary
(budget/accounting officer) levels. In short, the commands,
including the comptroller organizations themselves, tend to be
middle-of-the-road with respect to a centralization/decentrali-
zation continuum.
Comptroller organizations tend to be formalized with respect
to operations. The results of the survey indicate that written
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procedural rules and regulations are strictly followed with
few exceptions. In addition, upward communications are per-
ceived by the comptrollers as being quite free flowing.
According to the survey, the various functions of comptrol-
lership (budgeting, accounting, ADP, internal review, special
reports) are highly interdependent and require close coordina-
tion. The functions tend to be fairly specialized.
The responses to the comptroller questionnaire indicate
that the inputs to the typical comptroller organization are
more than moderately standardized and predictable. The func-
tions are perceived by the comptroller as being somewhat rou-
tine (mid-range response) with fairly high complexity. The
typical comptroller organization is about 50% automated.
In the typical comptroller organization, employees are
granted moderate discretion (mid-range response) regarding
the conduct of their jobs (i.e., hours, methods, output).
Quality control of individual output as well as employee
performance feedback are considered to be of great importance
in the typical comptroller organization.
Appendices D and E (Comptrollers' comments) demonstrate
the concern of Navy field comptrollers for the behavioral
aspects of their jobs, especially technology/structure and
leadership aspects. The following chapter will offer con-
clusions which can be drawn from the results of the question-





V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL
The purpose of this thesis as stated in the introduction
was to present an organizational perspective for the job of
the Navy field comptroller with the intent of assisting the
new comptroller with the start-up process. A brief history
of comptrollership in the U.S. Government and the Navy was
presented, followed by a description of the present day func-
tions of Navy field comptrollership, in order to acquaint the
reader with the function to be analyzed.
An organizational analysis model for comptrollership, re-
ferred to as the "comptrollership model," was presented which
was derived from several well known behavioral theories . The
purpose in designing the model is to assist the new comptrol-
ler in rapidly sizing up the organization and determining
whether or not optimal structures, leadership styles, and
decision-making methods are being employed. The model states
that these controllable variables are determined to a great
extent by the environment; the technology of comptrollership;
the characteristics of the leader, the followers, and the
situation; and the types of decision-making situations.
A survey was conducted of actual Navy field comptrollers
to determine the current state of many of the dependent
variables of the model. Although comptroller organizations
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will differ in many respects, the survey was intended to give
the new comptroller a general view of what to expect prior to
reporting to the new command. He or she will still have to
evaluate conditions at the new command individually in ac-
cordance with the comptrollership model.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The comments of Navy field comptrollers as presented in
Appendices D and E indicate a strong need for a device such
as the comptrollership model presented in this thesis. For
example, the common thread throughout the comments is the fact
that the new comptroller must start slow, size up the organi-
zation, learn the organizational structure/technology, and
get to know the people within the department as well as the
other department heads. The comptrollership model will assist
the new comptroller in knowing what to be aware of. For
example, he/she must be able to assess the state of the or-
ganization, spot mismatches concerning structure and tech-
nology, and know how to correct such situations. The new
comptroller can utilize the model to map new situations by
following the prescribed guidelines. For example, if a de-
cision is going to be made to increase the amount of discre-
tion which is held by lower levels in the organization, the
following modifications to the structure should be made:
(1) decrease the levels in the hierarchy if possible, (2)
increase the adherence to rules and written procedures,
(3) ensure vertical communications are maximized.
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One type of possible bias in the data analysis which was
not previously discussed could be present due to the combi-
nations of large and small organizations, military and civilian
comptrollers, male and female comptrollers, and experienced and
non-experienced comptrollers. A break-out of the different
categories might produce different results.
In the decision-making section of the questionnaire, more
than any other section, this author feels that bias is most
prevalent. This is due primarily to the social desirability
aspect of the decision making choices. It is the contention
of this author that more comptrollers are prone to using the
organizational processes and bureaucratic politics methods
than the data indicate. Following standard operating pro-
cedures and directives in making decisions is a way of life
for the military officer. An additional attribute of the
military officer is concern for career. These aspects of
the comptroller's way of life indicate that the two non-rational
methods of decision-making will probably be followed more
often than the comptrollership model prescribes. The reason
for the popularity of the rational response is hypothesized
to be its social desirability. Nevertheless, when a decision-
making situation arises in which the comptroller does not know
what method to employ, the model can be utilized to assist in
selecting an optimal decision-making method.
A final conclusion indicated by Appendices D and E is that
comptrollers are being sent into the field unprepared to deal
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with the behavioral aspects of their organizations. It is
apparent from the comments that comptroller training is ade-
quate with regard to technical areas but is lacking in the
behavioral aspects.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis was intended to be an initial exploration into
the behavioral aspects of comptrollership and is in no way the
final word on the subject. It is a starting point for further
research and offers a framework which can be refined and ex-
panded. For example, refinement is needed in the measures
utilized in order to eliminate bias from resulting data as
much as possible. Data can be analyzed by subsamples such as
experience level of the comptroller, sex of the comptroller,
size of the command, or military status of the comptroller.
This type of analysis could open up a whole new area of the
effects the particular attributes of the comptroller or the
command have on the comptroller organization itself. In the
structure/technology portion of the research, partial correla-
tion analysis should be performed to identify separate effects
of all independent variables on the dependent variables.
The comments of Appendices D and E indicate a substantial
lack of organizational awareness and direction by new comp-
trollers upon commencing their tours as comptrollers. It is
a contention of this thesis that such a condition can be
partially remedied through formal education. It is felt by
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this author that the Practical Comptrollership Course at the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, is the best
place in which to implement such a program. The emphasis on
organizational behavior should be expanded from its present
two-hour lecture and aimed directly at the comptroller's or-
ganization as it presently exists, not at organizations in
general. The techniques used in this thesis for gathering
pertinent data on actual comptroller organizations should be
explored with regard to developing such a course of instruction
Because of the importance of organizational awareness addressed
in Appendices D and E, follow on research should be conducted
to expand on the conclusions presented here.
In addition to attending such a course of instruction, the
future Navy field comptroller can shorten his/her start-up
process through use of the comptrollership model presented
in this thesis. Technological characteristics of the organi-
zation should be rapidly surveyed and compatibility of struc-
tures reassessed in accordance with the model. Characteristics
of the employees, the situation, and the comptroller need to
be analyzed in order to arrive at appropriate leadership pat-
terns. The types of decision-making situations must be ana-
lyzed in order to decide quickly on which type of decision-
making methods to employ. For instance, if the situation is
a crisis (high threat, short time fuze, and no warning) , there
will be no time to successfully employ the rational decision-
making method. The most likely response would be to follow
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SOPs, satis fice, or try a solution which has worked in the
past (examples of the organizational processes method) . The
comptrollership model will assist the comptroller in deciding
which methods to use in many different situations. It is there-
fore intended as a guide.
It must be remembered that the comptroller's organization
is a service organization charged with facilitating information
flow. The tools presented in this thesis were designed to
assist the comptroller in utilizing available resources in the




SUMMARY OF TITLE IV
The following is a summary of Title IV of the National Se-
curity Act Amendments of 1949 as quoted from The Functions
and Corresponding Processes Involved With Field Level
Comptrollership by John C. Matthews.
Section 401 . This established the position of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and held the incumbent
responsible for the preparation of an integrated military
budget, the establishment of efficient and economic policies
and procedures relating to the expenditure and collection
of funds administered by the Department of Defense and the
development of uniform terminologies and classifications.
Section 402 . This section requires each of the depart-
mental comptrollers to organize their operations in a manner
which was consistent with those of the office of the Comp-
troller in the Department of Defense. It also permitted
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) to appoint either
a civilian or a military (line or staff) person as the
departmental comptroller. In cases where the departmental
comptroller is a military officer, the deputy comptroller
is to be a civilian.
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Section 403 . Under the budget and appropriation structure
existing at that time, almost every project and/or program
undertaken by the Federal Government required, for its
execution, financing from numerous appropriations. Usually,
such appropriations were managed or administered by scat-
tered and sometimes unrelated organizational divisions.
Such administration inevitably hindered the achievement of
economy and efficiency. Section 40 3 was intended to facil-
itate administration by financing each identifiable budget
program from a single source, encourage the fixing of
management responsibility, simplify reporting and permit
departmental management and the Congress to determine costs
and to evaluate progress and accomplishment. The per-
formance budget was to focus attention upon the general
character and relative importance of work to be done and
services to be rendered rather than upon things to be ac-
quired, such as personal services, supplies and equipment.
This section intended that there be a logical and uniform
grouping of projects or budget programs by the primary
functions of the military departments paralleling the
organization and management structure.
Section 40 4 . This section required the Secretary of Defense
to approve scheduled rates of obligation of funds appropriated
to the departments before any obligation took place. This
was not intended to interfere with internal operations , but
rather to prevent overdrafts or deficiencies.
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Section 405 . This section authorizes the Secretary of
Defense to require the establishment of working capital
funds in the departments and agencies of the Department of
Defense to finance inventories and to provide working
capital for industrial and commercial type activities. It
provided legal authority for the operation of funds and
provided that the working capital funds be charged in appro-
priate circumstances for the cost of stores, supplies,
materials and equipment which were procured or which were
manufactured, repaired, issued or consumed. It also pro-
vided that the working capital funds were to be charged for
services rendered or for work performed. A provision was
made to reimburse the funds from available appropriations
for the cost of material and/or services provided by the
funds. The amounts which were to be charged or credited
to the funds were to include administrative expenses, and
the operations of the funds were to be reported annually
to the President and to the Congress. If the amount of
working capital deemed by the Secretary to be required was
not fully provided by operations, Congress could appropriate
further sums as necessary. Under the procedures existing
at the time, little control existed over the use of material
on hand procured with prior year resources. One of the
purposes of this section was to restrict the requesting
agency from incurring any greater cost for such items than
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the amount of appropriated funds available for such pur-
poses. Additionally, items returned to inventory were to
be credited to the proper appropriation. This was intended
to discourage the stockpiling of material and supplies and
thereby afford a greater availability to other potential
users. Finally, this section formalized the use of working
capital funds in industrial type activities. In effect,
working capital would be available to those who ran or
administered industrial or commercial type activities per-
forming common service. It made these officials respon-
sible for the money they spent, the costing of each job
and the most economical method of accomplishing the work.
All costs of the operation would be paid by the working
capital fund, using commercial practices for the distri-
bution of direct and indirect costs to the jobs in progress,
The agency placing a work order with such an activity would
establish commitments and obligations against resources
appropriated to it. The industrial plant would enter the
order and distribute the work in the plant by its own job
orders. When the work is completed and the cost of the job
ascertained, the plant would invoice the cost to the
ordering agency charging the proper appropriation and
budget program.
Section 406 . This section created management funds. These
funds, as distinguished from working capital funds, are not
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revolving or continuing funds. They constitute an allotment
of money to a common pool for a special purpose. They
provide a management tool for economical and efficient
administration of specific joint operations, or operations
requiring the support of two or more appropriations where
the distribution of costs cannot be easily determined.
Management funds are authorized to incur expenditures for
material (other than for stock) and for services under
regulations which the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
All expenditures by a fund, however, must be properly
chargeable to available appropriated funds of the department
within which the fund is established or in special circum-
stances, to appropriated funds of another department or
agency. Expenditures by the fund must be reimbursed by
proper appropriations; and advances and reimbursements
from appropriations on the basis of estimated costs of the
projects are authorized. Amounts advanced to management
funds are available for obligation only during the fiscal
year in which they were advanced and final adjustments must
be made for all obligations created during that fiscal year.
Section 40 7 . This was intended to facilitate accounting
and to provide for the transfer of funds from one military
department to another when a function is reassigned under
authority of law. For example, if the purchase function
for a given class of material is assigned to one department
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during a fiscal year, the funds appropriated to the one or
two departments no longer performing that function may be
transferred to the department newly charged with that
function. This section does not authorize the transfer
of any functions; it simply provides administrative mech-
anisms which can be utilized when and if functions are
transferred.
Section 40 8 . This section permits the creation of reim-
bursements and sums paid by a department for supplies or
services rendered to authorized replacing accounts. The
effect of this section was to permit direct charges to be
made against the appropriations of the department receiving
benefit from the supplies or services. Furthermore, it
eliminated the necessity of establishing working fund
advance accounts between the military departments.
Section 409 . This section makes the disbursing and
accounting services of one military department available
to the other departments in order to realize savings.
Section 410 . This simply expanded the record keeping
function already performed by the Navy and specified the
nature of the reports to be submitted by each department.
Section 411 . This section repealed all laws, orders and






The following is quoted from the NAVCOMPT Manual, Volume
I, Chapter 2, article 012100
1. Provide an integrated system for financial management .
An integrated system for financial management is established,
coordinated, and maintained by the comptroller or cognizant
personnel in order to provide the commanding officer with
the factual data essential for effective management control
of operations. The comptroller is responsible for:
* technical guidance and direction of financial matters
throughout the organization as a staff service to
the commanding officer;
* maintenance of a classification of the programs
administered and their objectives and a current in-
ventory of budget plans and program schedules;
* budget formulation, review, and execution;
* collection of obligation, expenditure, cost, and
other accounting and operating statistics data;
* review of program performance against the financial
plan;




2. Budgeting . Personnel engaged in budgeting provide technical
guidance and instructions for preparation of the budget.
They review requirements and justifications for the various
programs and prepare estimates of the cost thereof and
compile the annual budget and other budgetary data as
required by authorities in the review cycle. They recom-
mend distribution of available funds and civilian personnel
to programs within the command and revisions thereof, as
required; issue funding documents reflecting approved
distributions of available resources; analyze variances
from the budget plan and recommend remedial action where
appropriate; determine areas where desirable financial
reprogramming may be effected; initiate action to adjust
financial plans to available funds; and, when required,
submit requests and justifications for additional funds.
3. Accounting and Disbursing . At the field activity level,
accounting personnel are responsible for:
* maintenance of required accounting records, including
records of obligations and expenditures against allot-
ments and project orders;
* preparation of accounting reports both for local
management and for submission to higher authority;
* conduct of cost accounting operations; maintenance of
plant property records and financial records of in-
ventory transactions of all classes of property, and
submission of all property returns;
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* supervision and conduct of timekeeping operations;
* maintenance of civilian pay, leave and retirement
records, and preparation of civilian payrolls.
In accordance with applicable policies, regulations, and
procedures, personnel engaged in disbursing perform:
* functions of payment of civilian payrolls, receiving
and depositing collections and, when authorized, the
payment of military payrolls, public vouchers, and
issuance of savings bonds;
* maintenance of the required disbursing records and
the preparation and submission of disbursing reports
and returns.
4. Program Analysis . Personnel engaged in program analysis
measure and analyze performance, program status, and trends
against the approved programs and budget plans and schedules
and report the results of operations to responsible levels
of command. The accounting system provides for the col-
lection of data that will permit this kind of appraisal
and detection of variances from the operating and budget
plan so that management can take the appropriate action.
This function of comptrollership is considered an extremely
important staff service to the commanding officer who has
the responsibility for decisions. Analysis and comparisons
should be timely and presented with recommendations for




5. Progress Reports and Statistics . Personnel engaged in the
progress reports and statistics function develop guides
and criteria for the collection and coordination of
statistical data and prepare special statistics as required
by responsible levels of command. The organizational
component exercising this function serves as coordinator
and official clearance center for the release of statistical
data. Each organizational component will have distinctive
requirements for periodic progress reports and for special
statistical data on the programs it administers. Statis-
tical reports should be rendered in a timely manner and
in a form that will insure optimum use of management.
6. Internal Review . Internal review (e.g., financial review,
analysis, and trouble shooting) is a responsibility of
command and will be performed at all installations. It
will not impinge, however, upon the functions of internal
audit which are the responsibility of the Comptroller of
the Navy. The principal functions of internal review
consist of:
* conducting special studies, analyses, and investi-
gations of comptroller areas for the purpose of
promptly detecting and correcting troublesome and
unsatisfactory conditions arising in connection with
established financial practices, procedures, records,
accounting systems, statements, and reports;
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* performing audits of nonappropriated fund activities;
* rendering assistance in correcting deficiencies which
are revealed from time to time by internal audits
conducted by the Director, Naval Audit Service or
by reports, analyses, observation, or other means;
* adapting and participating in the installation of
approved financial and accounting systems and
procedures
;
* developing and coordinating financial programs,
procedures, and controls, such as programs for
checking labor and material distributions;
* rendering advice on matters of organization and
staffing within comptroller areas;
* maintaining liaison with, and providing assistance
to, internal auditors of the Director, Naval Audit
Service assigned to perform continuous, periodic,
or integrated audits;






Please answer the following questions.
1. Are you military or civilian?
2. Is this your first tour as a comptroller?
3. How long have you held your current billet?
4. Approximately how many personnel are attached
to your command?
5. Approximately how many personnel are attached
to your department?
6. How many personnel report directly to you?
7. How many hierarchical levels are there in your
department?
8. To whom in the command do you have reporting
responsibility?
Please circle the most appropriate answer to each
question below.
9. At what organizational level are command financial
decisions made within your organization?
At the CO. level At the CO. level At the comptroller
only with little (CO. relies heavily level (CO. rubber





10. At what level are routine decisions made internal to the
comptroller organization?
At the comptroller At secondary levels At the lowest




11. To what extent are written procedural rules and regula-
tions followed within the comptroller organization?
(concerning functional procedures)
Rules strictly Rules usually Rules seldom if




12. How do you perceive the freedom and amount of upward
communication within the comptroller organization?12 3 4 5
High Essential commu- Very little if
nications usually any.
get to the top.
13. How dependent upon one another are the different functions
within the comptroller organization?12 3 4 5
Very dependent Somewhat dependent Not at all.
14. How important is coordination among the different functions
within the comptroller organization?12 3 4 5
Very important Somewhat important. Not at all.
15. How specialized are the various functions within the
comptroller organization?12 3 4 5
Highly specialized. Somewhat specialized. Not at all.
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16. How standardized would you say the inputs to the
individual job functions are within the comptroller organization?12 3 4 5
Highly standardized Somewhat standardized. Not at all.
17. How predictable would you say the inputs are to the
various functions within the comptroller organization?12 3 4 5
Very predictable. Somewhat predictable. Not at all.
18. How routine would you say the various functions are
within the comptroller organization?12 3 4 5
Very routine. Somewhat routine. Not at all.
19. How complex are the operations of the comptroller
organization taken as a system?
1 2 3 4 5
Highly complex. Somewhat complex. Not at all.
20. How much automation exists regarding the operations of
the comptroller organization?
Almost totally About 50% automated. Very little if
automated. any automation.
21. How much discretion do the people in your department
have regarding the conduct of their jobs? (i.e. hours, methods,
output, etc.)12 3 4 5
High discretion. Moderate amount. Little, if any.
22. Is there much emphasis within your department concerning
quality control of individual output?12 3 4 5
Much emphasis. Moderate emphasis. Little, if any.
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24. The following is a list of situations in which decisions
sometimes must be made. In the blanks to the right, try to
list the approximate percentage of the time you make decisions


































25. From the following list, check at least six words/phrases
which pertain to the process you use as the Comptroller in
making decisions concerning your department and the command.




prefer incremental change to current policy rather





sell the decision to CO.
divide problem into factors to be divided among sub-
units in the organization
analyze each alternative (e.g., economic analysis,
cost/benefit, etc.)
effect of decision on my own career
usually pick first acceptable alternative
list assumptions concerning alternatives
pick alternative which provides feedback
make decision by picking the best alternative
26. Briefly list those areas which gave you the most problems
during your first hundred days as a comptroller. Please expound
upon what you feel caused the problems.
27. Do you have any advice for the new comptroller with re-






The following are verbatim responses to the following question
from Navy field comptrollers: "Briefly list those areas which
gave you the most problems during your first hundred days as
a comptroller." This author makes no claim concerning the
validity of the following comments.
1. The method of obtaining funds available for special projects
outside of those permitted under the NIF accounting system.
2. Understanding just what latitude I had in affecting real-
location of resources, i.e., fenced $, floors, ceilings, poli-
tics, civilian personnel rules, regulations, etc. Lack of
experience.
3. Understanding key operational factors that underlie budge-
tary requirements. Lack of experience.
4. Overly complex/technical requirements for budget format.
Insecure major claimant.
5. Potential violation of R.S. 367 9 - The station expenditure
plan estimated MRP labor costs too high (8 00K out of a 1000K
total MRP ceiling/floor) . Actual labor costs are running
approximately 100K below the plan. As a result, the ceiling/
floor will not be achieved.
6. Financial Inventory Report (FIR) - The three sections of
the FIR that I'm responsible for, do not balance. Two of
these sections were last balanced in 1966. Engines are out
of balance by over two million, fuel around two hundred thou-
sand and servmart currently exceeds authorized percentage
variance. We are going to try and correct this problem this
month
.
7. Additional funds are required for BA-3. Funds are required
for utility and telephone support for the rest of this year.
I will write a letter requesting the additional funds. If we




8. Record keeping - Cost center records and the official
records are in such bad shape, that I don't know within 200K
of where we stand.
9. Internal review - The station does not have an internal
auditor. However, this does not eliminate the requirement to
perform the required audits. There was no established audit
program. A board was established, but nothing was done or at
least there was no record with one exception (EMO)
.
10. Plant and minor property - There is no control on Plant
or Minor Property. For example, we have no idea as to the
number of typewriters on station.
11. The functions of many staff organizations internal to the
command were not well defined.
12. The comptroller has an obvious statutory role to perform;
however, he has other staff functions for which he should be
responsible as well. It was difficult for me to enter into
an environment in which the role of the comptroller was that
of being a "bean counter" which limited many of the functions
which had previously been assigned to me as comptroller at
other activities.
13. Uncovering the "pots" of contingency funds my predecessor
failed to mention during the relieving process.
14. Training a new Budget Officer.
15. Replacing an authoritarian management style with a
participative management style.
16. The establishment of my knowledge base with respect to
accounting techniques.
17. Employees were previously given only the information
required for their desks, no information was shared; cross
training was "token"; supervisor continually watched over
the shoulders of employees.
18. Most decisions previously were made based upon getting
another department into the debt of the comptroller so he
could extract favors or repayment for future personal gain.
19. Learning the strengths/weaknesses of the department, i.e.,
where to turn and to whom.
20. Addressing/resolving the current "hot" subjects such as




21. Establishing interface/relationship with other depart-
ments, their thoughts, weeding out the chaff.
22. Knowing who all the players were and their interrelationship
23. Tennant reimbursables were a big problem with regard to
common services to be provided to them.
24. Document flow. Each area (supply, comptroller, automated
data processing, etc.) requires its own unique information
on chits.
25. Accountability is lacking in the Public Works/ROICC area.
26. All knowledge of financial management at the activity is
vested in one civilian position (GS-11) who does not share
knowledge, and has a "bean-counting" approach. A military
comptroller soon retreats to a passive role as other interests
appear more rewarding/less frustrating.
27. Assistance from the major claimant is negligible.
28. End of fiscal year surprises. A two-week turnover in
August did not include a comprehensive list of "oh-by-the-ways.
"
During turnover, you should review in detail the fiscal posi-
tion of the activity and all possible adjustments which could
impact the fiscal position - this is highly complex at an
industrial funded activity.
29. Loss of five key personnel due to retirement and transfer
created a situation in which I had to train replacements im-
mediately. Problem was caused by a lack of significant cross-
training to help pick up the workload while a training program
was implemented.
30. Errors made by staff until my learning curve allowed me
to catch them before they went out.
31. In addition to responsibilities for comptrollership, this
job also has systems responsibilities for the facility. During
the first 100 days, I was beset with a number of systems prob-
lems that impacted the accuracy of accounting and performance
reports. It took a long time for me to sort out the problems,
determine the responsibility and start action to correct/
resolve the problem.
32. Figuring out who really does what.
33. Learning command procedures/policies.
34. Determining capabilities of subordinates.
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35. Determining requirements/desires of superiors.
36. Learning the informal organization.
37. Understanding the "weird" aspects of ashore accounting
(e.g., the end of year, drop from inventory problem). Ad-
ditionally, the accounting systems handling of reimbursable
work.
38. Budget. We received results from mid year review late
from Headquarters . Staff was trying to sort out mid year
results and develop strategy for remainder of FY79 while
also developing Operating Budget Request for FY80. Both
projects are time consuming and trying to do both at once
was chaotic. Add to this a brand new CO. along with the
new comptroller and other department heads trying to "help"
and confusion was rampant.
39. The Deputy Comptroller position is vacant. The Budget
Supervisor position is becoming vacant in two weeks. The
accounting supervisor is leaving in three weeks. Major
positions are all "turning over."
40. Ensuring that the books at year-end close-out were accurate.
Cause: Accounting Activity (through consolidation in prepar-
ing for IDA) is not in the chain of command; therefore, not
as responsive as one which might be under the direct control
of the local activity. (I guess this is a personal complaint
but consolidations are removing the authority to get a job
done, while not removing the responsibility for ensuring that
it's done correctly.)
41. The volume of rules, regulations, and constraints that
are applicable to the -Resource Authorization that the command
receives.
42. The FY80 budget crisis was the big technical problem.
No continuing resolution at commencement of the fiscal year
and no operating budget for the first four months . Critical
decisions were required while I was "learning the ropes."
43. Staffing. The previous comptroller avoided personnel
and organizational changes that were obviously needed.
44. Establishment of credibility. Financial controls were
not emphasized and authority had to be established on the
station. This can only work out - as it did - with absolute
support of the CO.
45. Training. It was necessary to bring the level of profes-
sionalism in the comptroller department up to standards and to
get the message over to other dept. personnel.
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46. Determining organizational relationships within the unit,
i.e., who stood where.
47. Understanding objectives and management style of the CO.
48. What priority in the operation of the unit was funding
related, or what role the comptroller had in the overall issues
facing the unit CO.
49. Recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of personnel
within the department.
50. The only problem, and it still exists, is that there are
no real standard ways of running a Comptroller Department.
51. Establishment of self with CO. and department heads.
52. Learning the underlying power structure of the civilian
employees. (A GS-7 may have more influence with the CO.
than anyone else on the station.)
53. Coordinating efforts at the next highest level of command.
54. Development of consistency in reporting requirements to
higher authority.
55. Knowing where the CO. wants to apply available resources.
56. Finding out what each department does.
57. Finding out each department's resource requirements.
58. Finding out the capabilities of subordinates.
59. Redesigned budget call - Caused by previous CO. who did
not have faith in comptroller and ran entire budget from his
office.
60. Adjusting to new financial system (i.e., different than
previous system)
.
61. Learning "pressure points" (i.e., where, when, and how
to exert financial management influence)
.
62. Lack of automation coupled with expanded requirements
caused severe response problems in first buget submission.
63. Lack of management willingness/foresignt to affect changes
in budget formulation to automate where practical.
64. Learning the jargon. After that it is mostly common sense
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65. Determining internal procedures.
66. Familiarization with unique accounting problems. Internal
methods and procedures vary from command to command. While
accounting is technically standardized, procedural variations
are often difficult to deal with.
67. Learning new accounting systems.
68. Determining individual employee capabilities/knowledge
base.
69. High personnel turnover/insufficient personnel. High
personnel turnover is normally caused by low grade jobs of
technicians who must move between commands for early advance-
ment opportunities.
70. Personnel - employee grievances emerged due to poor
supervisory practices and promotion procedures under predeces-
sor who seemed to have followed an abdicative leadership
style.
71. "Fence mending" and "bridge building" with other organiza-
tions which viewed the comptroller organization people as "bean
counters" whose ineptness was the cause of their budget and
funding problems . The budget process was handled by the comp-
troller as a mystery understandable only by budget analysts
without participation by individual cost centers
.
72. Evaluation of data/info provided by line managers and
assigning a true value.
73. Finding out what was going on. Subordinates felt a need
to hide what was going on lest any problems become evident
and they would be blamed.
74. Separate fiefdom concept among department heads. Each
department tended to act independently with little considera-
tion of the impact on others and little willingness to discuss
problems or issues of mutual concern.
75. Overcoming the stigma of being viewed as the same as an
unpopular predecessor and of being military in a civilian
department.
76. Personnel - adjustments and changes.
77. Developing credibility with the other department heads
who will look to you as the instant authority on finance.
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78. Staff mentality too mechanical/rigid and not analytical/
questioning/flexible/helpful enough
.
79. Inadequate feedback from comptroller organization to
other elements of the command. In other words, the comptrol-
ler served too much as funnel for information going up with
little info being returned to other command elements
.
80. Comptroller organization operated on a reactive/defensive
basis vice anticipating/offering assistance/simplifying/partner-
ship relationship with other elements of command.
81. Lack of comptroller emphasis in requirement for establish-
ment and maintenance of credibility in budgeting and program
execution.
82. Getting to know the individuals by name and their individual
functions as opposed to the functions of the sections or
branches
.
83. Problems caused by new local accounting system procedures.
84. Problems caused by lack of training for all comptroller
personnel.
85. Some people expected me to know all of the details of
the financial management function - details that even in the
longer term would be most relevant to the functions of people
working for the accounting officer rather than known exhaustively
to the comptroller. I think this is due to misunderstanding of
the comptroller role; some technical people seem to think he
is the chief accountant rather than a resource manager.
86. Limited experience/vocabulary in the field made it diffi-
cult to take over the real reins of power in the department.
87. Lack of knowledge of civilian personnel system made it very
difficult to take an active part in staffing decisions.
88. Trying to learn the organization and restore power to the
throne. The previous comptroller had abdicated all responsi-
bility to a very strong and capable deputy.
89. Personnel problems - an area of continuing concern.
90. Budget execution, in that no one wants to follow their plan.
91. Data processing - if you don't control data processing,
you are in for a lot of grief.
92. Adjusting to the fact that you are a manager and are not
expected to perform day-to-day accounting/budgeting functions.
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93. Getting subordinates to consider alternatives to the
"old ways.
94. Convincing superiors that controls imposed by major
claimant and congress as well as the caveats of appropriation
law are real constraints and not just "bookkeeping drills."
95. Learning funding process.
96. Learning to psychologically adjust to the everyday
problem of "keeping the wolves away from the door."
97. Learning how to convince everyone concerned that finan-
cial resources are finite and the necessity for establishing
funding priorities.
98. Overcoming the "thisis the way we've always done it"
syndrome.
99. Establishing my own style of leadership.
100. Learning the vocabulary of shore accounting.
101. Communications and understanding - up and down the organi-
zation. The previous comptroller/budget officer had a "closed
shop" approach. Training was lacking. Subordinates did not
completely understand their role in the organization.
102. Clearning an EEO matter.
103. Precise requirements of subordinates not articulated in
command policy directives.
104. Spending philosophy in the Public Works Department. The
problem was caused by a poor line of communication between




ADVICE TO NEW COMPTROLLERS
The following are verbatim responses to the following question
from Navy field comptrollers: "Do you have any advice for the
new comptroller with regard to the 'start-up process'?" This
author makes no claim concerning the validity of the following
comments.
1. Find out what the C.O.'s philosophy is toward priorities,
Fleet support, morale, welfare & recreation, training, etc.
2. Let your subordinates know right away that they have the
expertise and that you will rely heavily on their professionalism.
3. Play openface with all department heads. For example, at
mid-year review, we all got together with departmental priori-
ties and formulated them into a station priority listing. Know-
ing this had been done, concurrence by the c.o. on our recom-
mendations was assured.
4. Don't try to make decisions behind locked doors. Share the
financial picture (or posture) with the other department heads




Use plain language when explaining financial matters - not
everyone is an accountant. (Especially the C.O.) Tell it like
it is, and you will earn his confidence. If the answer is no,
make sure he understands why.
6. Familiarize yourself with the organization, and determine
the various personalities that will be encountered throughout
the various other departments/offices.
7. Determine the objectives of both the Executive Officer and
the Commanding Officer of the activity.
8. Determine the extent of the latitude permitted by the Execu-
tive Officer and the Commanding Officer in the operation of the
comptroller office.




10. Advise other managers of the proper methods of obtaining
funds to accomplish in-house requirements
.
11. Know RMS accounting cold .
12. If you can't trust your budget officer, make him/her
sit down and explain exactly how he/she knows the status of
funds at all times
.
13. Try to know a lot about the operations of each department/
divison within the command. This will afford you the luxury of
not having to rubber-stamp their inputs.
14. Do not make any changes or rely on anyone until you have
your feet on the ground.
15. If the function is to be meaningful, comptroller personnel •
at whatever level of government - need to establish a different
identity from that which has evolved, i.e., green eyeshades and
making . arbitrary decisins based on procedural grounds. To be
successful, a comptroller should be a facilitator and perceived
as such. He should make decisions on substantive grounds. As
a professional, he will find himself in adversary relationships
not only internally but externally as well. He should be ra-
tional and make judgements based on substance, not procedure.
If rules do not make sense, he should challenge them. Above all
else, he should be as open as possible. He should never be
dogmatic and say that something can't be done without providing,
at the same time, a reason for it. In short, he should be ra-
tional and reasonable. He should establish himself as more
than just a "bean counter." He should be intricately involved
with the decision-making process. In point of fact, it is the
financial area in which all decisions come together and are
highlighted. Therefore, the management and, especially, the
interpersonal style of the comptroller is exceedingly important.
16. Establish yourself as being totally fair to all Depart-
ment Heads.
17. Advocate the total command rather than any single program.
18. Teach other department heads how to assemble "staff work"
and make them resposible for resource control within their
departments
.
19. Establish relationships with the CO. that allows the two
of you to speak candidly to each other.
20. Be innovative - don't let the rules get in the way of
providing the resources needed to give the care required by our
patients. Be a positive thinker rather than a negative one.
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You're -going to make mistakes; accept that fact and then get
on with the job. Your technicians will prevent you from
doing anything fatal.
21. Meet regularly with your Supply Officer, Staff Civil
Engineer, DCS, DAS, and CO.
22. Listen to your people, weed out the gripes from poten-
tially real work situations. Know what the 3rd and 4th levels
are thinking or think they think. Make a plan to address these
"thinks." Mind you I didn't say solve! They will test you as
you test them. Some routine questions will be posed along with
the complex. People respond better if they think they are a
part of the maangement process - so ask what they think before
blurting out your decision. Avoid the tendency to demonstrate
power - it is inherently yours.
23. Budget execution vs. plan. Track it and understand the
reason for variance. Develop alternatives for resolution and
means for selling them vice force feeding.
24. Get away from your desk and browse the other departments
noting the use of labor which makes up the biggest part of
your budget. Use internal review to confirm your suspicions
before attacking the matter.
25. Charts and graphs are fine as a barometer. But don't
over do it. I use very few, in notebook size, and only those
for top management info.
26. Develop a sound working relationship with all departments
and activities, especially supply, public works, and ADP.
27. Always be creditable with the people you fund and receive
funds from and keep an open line of communication with them
all.
28. Even though you're helping dept. heads, etc., remember
you work for the CO. and it's his policies you adhere to
within the command and external.
29. Don't look to make changes initially! Find out how it's
being done - completely - before any change is implemented.
Guided discussions with all concerned departments are very
beneficial.
30. There will always be a perceived need for changes. Don't
change anything unless its essential.
31. There's a considerable amount of stationary inertia as-




32. Let the civilians handle it at the "grass-roots" level.
33. Attend the PCC course at Monterey.
34. Get to know the organization ASAP (as soon as possible)
.
a. Personnel - strengths and weaknesses
b. Procedures - detailed data/document flow
c. Ask questions and compare answers to regulations/
NAVCOMPT manual, etc.
35. Get to know (visit/phone) headquarters comptroller
personnel - this informal communication can be invaluable.
36. When making a presentation to the "front office" try to
anticipate questions and be prepared with all the facts.
37. Learn the personality of the Commanding Officer. It's
much easier to accomplish the job when one can expect a certain
response from the C.O.
38. Ensure that the employees in the comptroller shop are
made aware that you, the comptroller, know your job. A brief,
totally informal training session accomplished this for me.
39. Listen to your employees. Those many years of experience
are frequently beneficial.
40. Keep the C.O. informed. He has the ultimate responsibility
and should be made aware if any problems are developing. He may
look to his comptroller for solutions to the problems, but at
least he will know what is happening.
41. Be skeptical.
42. Check the detail carefully.
43. Don't assume years of experience means a person knows
what he is doing.
44. Develop multiple lines of communications into the organi-
zation to learn what is really going on. Do not rely exclu-
sively on the chain of command flow of information, up or down.
45. Learn the details, understand the system better than your
staff. Don't rely excessively on others.
46. If the new comptroller is coming from a job outside the
activity, I would recommend that he/she insist on a thorough
indoctrination in the new activity. It makes getting the job
done later on much easier. Further, if it is the first time
the individual has had a comptrollership, a formal training
program in Navy comptrollership is essential.
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47. Don't be afraid to ask questions.
48. Don't try and do everyone's job.
49. Read available technical and administrative guidance con-
cerning what the comptroller's job really is.
50. I would suggest spending time with the NAVCOMPT and type
commander publications, then getting deeply into past budgets
versus actual performance data, and finally, application of
budget/actual history to current and future year budgets
already submitted or in the works.
51. Get all the background training possible - PCC course in
Monterey is good.
52. Have enough time to relieve and insist on thorough
briefings.




Get thorough briefing from all departments on what they
do and get to know the command - mission, problems, etc.
55. Ensure open communications with XO and CO and make sure
you know their funding philosophies.
56. Find out who can you believe and trust.
57. Establish where the financial decisions are really going
to be made (CO or the comptroller)
.
58. Develop a good working relationship with department
heads.
59. Don't "stir up the pot" too soon unless there are major
problem areas.
60. Listen to what your assigned personnel (usually civilians)
have to say.
61. The job is too big for one person - be a director and
let the people under you do their jobs.
62. Don't try to "know" all the rules and regulations but
know where they are to be found.
63. Get a basic understanding of the overall system before
working with your own small segment. Try to understand the
importance of your part on the whole.
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64. Develop skill in systematic problem solving in order to
"allocate the deficiencies" in resource funding.
65. Understand 3679/3678 implications.
66. If you're military, it will be necessary to have a very
competent dynasty, both to help you in the first 6 months and
to provide continuity.
67. Never let the authority of the comptroller as primary
financial advisor to the CO be taken over by anyone else.
68. Keep your temper, humor and perspective.
69. Be aware that there is a tendnency for all accountants
to have tunnel vision - I'm one and had to overcome this.
There is far more to financial management than tracking costs.
70. A new comptroller must gain rapport, respect and confi-
dence with other department heads so that mutual faith and
understanding can develop. .The feeling that the comptroller
can be trusted is most important. A comptroller can overuse
his power easily, but the loss of respect in addressing issues
will make him vastly less effective in solving problems related
to command issues and others in the unit will attempt to bypass
him. He will be left on the fringes of decision making.
71. Visit and meet with every department head/cost center
manager. Tour all spaces of your command (Know where your $'s
are going) . Get out of the office and into the field. Com-
munication is vital.
72. Sit with each employee and go over their job, responsi-
bilities, and daily routine. After meeting with employees,
have supervisors tie together work and document flow within
each area.
73. Establish monthly meeting with all cost center managers
for each sub-head of funding. Use as training session and
problem solving opportunity.
74. Don't be overly conservative. It's just as bad not to
fully utilize your funds as it is to over-expend.
75. Take it easy - go in slow, say little - listen a lot.
Never use threats of witholding funds or giving money out to
a few favorites. The comptroller is an advisor to command.
He is not the CO.
76. Keep an open mind toward all requirements. Help the CO.
prioritize, but don't do it yourself.
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77. Get out of your office and look around. Know and fully
understand the mission of the command and what it takes to
support that mission.
78. Maintain your credibility. It's all you've got. Lose it,
and the ball game is over.
79. Find out early what each department is responsible for.
80. Feel out what the CO. thinks is important.
81. Be the comptroller - don't do your job by committee.
82. Point to remember - you must live with what your prede-
cessor did with relation to the budget for at least two years.
Depending on the length of tour you may never execute a budget
you developed and submitted.
83. Make changes slowly and with deliberation. Trust your
subordinates, but make changes when/where needed.
84. Read professional publications extensively.
85. Work long hours; depend on those people who you determine
to be knowledgeable for the necessary technical expertise you
need.
86. Listen, observe, keep an open mind, attempt to remain
flexible and gain a quick insight into the capabilities of
comptroller managers and supervisors.
87. Remember you are a service organization and that's all
you have to sell. Be truthful and honest in dealing with your
counterparts
.
88. Ask lots of questions. Don't take anything for granted.
89. Develop working relationships with other departments.
90. Get out of the office and find out what is happening in
other areas of the command.
91. Decide what data is important to you and that employees
know what data you want.
92. Understanding of rules and regulations for the following
functions
:
Disbursing - legal expenditures
- travel
Contracts - OMB Circular A76
Civilian Personnel - pay/leave




93. Get to know your organization and people soonest.
94. Try to say "no" as little as possible—even when the "yes"
must have a caveat; e.g., "yes sir we can pay for your change
of command reception from appropriated funds if we can get the
voucher through the paying office (or, if you're ready to pay
back the funds when the auditors pick it up) .
"
95. Take it slowly; study organization and its modus operandi;
show interest; ask questions; outline your proposed management
methods/philosophy; sit down with CO and clearly enunciate what
you think your function is and have him enunciate what he
thinks it should be - some bending may be necessary on your
part initially but as time goes on you can slowly ingratiate
your methods, procedures, management/comptrollership philosophy
into fiber of organization especially with CO.
96. Insure you establish and maintain free, quick, formal and
informal communication channels with other departments and
especially CO as well as within your department.
97. Don'it be reluctant to call/visit comptrollers of similar
organizations to find out how they operate.
98. Don't get overly involved in nitty-gritty details (al-
though some involvement in details is good on an occasional
basis)
.
99. Demonstrate confidence in your subordinates - after all,
they have been doing the job - at least getting by - for many
years prior to your arrival. After a while, plant seeds for
changes you want to make and let them come up with formal
changes - if they think its their idea, there is much less
inertia to overcome. Above all, be open, maintain your cool,
use common sense , be consistent, utilize every opportunity
you have to give public recognition for above average effort,
be fair and be patient (changes are not usually made overnight)
.
100. Insist on detailed briefings on current operations,
problems , etc
.
101. Try to find out as soon as possible who your dependable
knowledgeable people are and utilize their expertise to help
you during the initial period.
102. Don't bluff your own knowledge. If you don*t know exactly
how something is, don't make promises. Don't hesitate to con-
sult with your division directors. Many of the "small" prob-




103. Determine funds, type of funds, authorized to operate
the activity.
104. Review monetary controls in use and test check for
accuracy. Review last budget submission to major claimant.
Examine fund allocations for past two years to the various
activity departments. Review civilian personnel ceiling con-
trol and timekeeping function. Review internal auditors'
working papers of nonappropriated activities' audits.
105. If activity has submitted zero-based budget, review
prior to visiting the activity's departments. Under ZBB
each department was required to submit the functions performed,
as well as quantitative data and dollar amounts consumed in
the process for the past year, current year and the budget
year.
106. Visit all departments/activities to understand their
operation and problems. Get the feeling of general activity
operation and condition. Understand personnel strengths
and weaknesses.
107. If he is going into a well-established and well-regarded
organization - as I did - he should go slow, stay away from
making organizational/assignment changes, let the people run
their operations, do a lot of listening. If not heavily
versed in the details of financial management, and/or not
thoroughly aware of how the individual organization itself
operates, these tactics will help avoid the problem of getting
"put on the spot" too soon -either driven to make fiscal
decisions you're not yet qualified to make, or get the early
reputation for being indecisive. Should remember that financial
systems are volume production shops, very dependent on good
software. It takes 10 times as much lead time and effort as
you think it will to make even minor corrections, and even
the most logical paperwork streamlining processes always seem
to involve somebody's rice bowl - leading to near catastrophic
consequences if you try to make early changes based on logic
only, vs. local politics as well.
108. Go slow. Listen a lot. Demand that all matters be
staffed and come to you with the back-up material. Maintain
distance between you and your subordinates until you at least
think you have the informal organization in focus.
109. Get a good handle on the relationship between you and




110. Take personal control of the staffing function within
the department.
111. Listen to your people. Take their advice until you know
what you are doing. Pay particular attention to the advice
of your long term civilians.
112. Get to know your key personnel.
113. Get familiar with the command functions.
114. Be a manager and don't try to be a technical expert.
Leave the routine lower level effort to those people below
you and require your people to perform.
115. Understand what tools are provided by the management
information system (MIS) and how to use them.
116. Attend the two week practical comptrollership course
at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey.
117. Learn the organization structure at the activity.
118. Get on a first name basis with department heads ASAP.
119. Develop a working relationship with all deputy department
heads.
120. Become people oriented - they are your best source of info
121. For the "first time" comptroller, the two week course
at the PG school is a must.
122. Learn your financial program.
123. Learn the strengths and weaknesses of your subordinates.
124. Establish credibility and a good rapport with financial
mgt. personnel in the next echelon of command, i.e., type com-
mander, major claimant, etc.
125. Ascertain your superiors' approach to $ mgt., i.e., are
they conservative or "hi rollers."
126. Expand your interests beyond the comptrollership function-
indicate your interest in effecitvely/ef ficiently supporting
operations.
127. Approach your job with honesty, forthrightness , and a
large amount of diplomacy.
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128. Don't get bogged down in accounting details. Read
your civilian personnel position descriptions and insist
each employee perform accordingly.
129. Exercise common sense.
130. Get to know your command and the relative importance
of the various functions.
131. Keep your CO informed - visit with him often and don't
hesitate to offer advice concerning the appropriateness of
departmental spending.
132. Work closely with the civilian personnel department -
meet with the civilian personnel officer prior to position
management board meetings. Present a unified front to the
CO/XO on hiring plans.
133. Get away from your office and into working areas -
find out what is going on from the workers - military and
civilian.
134. Hope your civilian accounting types know what they're
doing. If you try to do it, you may have a great accounting
division but you will be a worthless comptroller.
135. Examine every employees' position description to deter-
mine what, how, and why. Compare all aspects of your responsi-
bilities as comptroller to what you are doing to ensure they
are being carried out.. Assume or delegate those not covered.
136. Do not assume anything, especially in procedures or
conformance with regulations, etc. I require subordinates
to show references as to why, in writing. This reduces
changes for misunderstanding in interpretation, etc., of
official directives.
137. Sit down with each employee and discuss their role and
the future of the organization.
138. Establish lines of communication with CO/XO and depart-
ment heads
.
139. Learn about your own people ASAP.
140. Learn your command, tennant commands, and base facili-
ties ASAP.
141. Know the rules and scope of comptrollership - know the
players and the competence thereof.
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14 2. You will have a position that will encompass a broad
range of guiding regulations, and the knowledge and compliance
existing within your activity can only be determined by keeping
your eyes and ears open and asking a lot of questions. If you
find things that are not on track - from the CO to an account-
ing technician - the problem is usually not one of intent but
lack of education, training, and awareness. Your's is a diffi-
cult position in that you have a mission to provide the resources
to the command that it's mission may be accomplished. Early on
you need to present your philosophies regarding financial mgt.
to the CO and get him supportive of the way you want to conduct
the comptrollership function. Develop your Internal Review as
the eyes and ears of command in both the appropriated and non-
appropriated area. This is an area that particularly needs
CO support - due to the feelings that can arise from Department
Heads that IR is looking over their shoulder and has no busi-
ness doing so. As in most aspects of your job, you must look
ahead - anticipate the pitfalls and pave the road so the pro-
gram will move in the direction you desire.
You will find much of the process is done a certain way
because its always been done that way. Unfortunately, the
civil service side - dedicated as they can be - are sometimes
deprived of on site turnovers, therefore (particularly with
regard to ADP) the corporate knowledge is reduced by some de-
gree with each position turnover. If you can demonstrate a
willingness to learn from them coupled with insight and under-
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